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Abstract 
This study presents evidence that unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate 
subsequent bankruptcy risk via their cash enhancing and informational properties.  Bankruptcy 
risk is in turn positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism and negatively 
associated with subsequent conditional conservatism, reflecting auditor and regulator 
monitoring and managerial career motives.  These findings are robust to endogeneity between 
unconditional and conditional conservatism, conservatism gaming, extreme distress and actual 
bankruptcy.  Combined, these results suggest that accounting conservatism both influences and 
is influenced by bankruptcy risk, thus lending support to a traditional rationale for 
conservatism that will help inform ongoing debates regarding conservatism’s role as a 
pervasive trait and tenet of financial accounting. 
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Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
1. Introduction 
We examine relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk and find 
negative associations between both unconditional and conditional conservatism and subsequent 
bankruptcy risk that follow from conservatism’s accrual nature, cash enhancing and 
informational properties.  Bankruptcy risk is in turn positively related to subsequent 
unconditional conservatism, consistent with auditor and regulator incentives, and negatively 
related to subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with offsetting managerial 
incentives to withhold bad news.  Overall, these findings will help inform ongoing debates 
regarding conservatism’s continuing role as a longstanding tenet and pervasive characteristic of 
financial accounting. 
Evidence that conservatism mitigates bankruptcy risk lends support to a traditional 
economic rationale for accounting conservatism that it arose at least a millennium ago in 
response to demands by capital providers to inform lending and liquidation decisions and 
reduce failure risk (De Ste. Croix (1956), Watts (2003), Basu (2009)).  Yet prior empirical 
evidence is mixed.  For example, whereas some studies find conservatism to reduce debt costs 
and by inference bankruptcy risk others find positive relations between conservatism and debt 
covenant violations (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman (2002), Zhang (2008), Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2008) and Li (2010)).  We are unaware of any prior study that empirically examines links 
between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk.1 
Evidence that accounting conservatism lowers bankruptcy risk is also central to the 
interests of debtholders and other stakeholders who would be adversely affected by firm 
failure.  These stakeholders shareholders (dividends and capital gains), managers and 
employees (career and compensation), customers (products and services), suppliers (sales), 
auditors and regulators (compliance) and governments (taxes and financial regulations).  This 
evidence also informs conservatism’s role in dampening economic panics, with recent financial 
crises heightening interest in mechanisms that counter bankruptcy-related contagions across 
supply chains, sectors and countries (Lang and Stulz (1992), Hertzel et al. (2008), Jorion et al. 
(2009).2 
                                                
1 Jones (2011) documents that R&D capitalization increases corporate failures, thus implying that expensing may reduce it.  
However, R&D expensing is an extreme form of unconditional conservatism relevant to R&D-intensive firms that cannot be 
readily generalized to other types of unconditional and conditional conservatism or firms. 
2 Lang and Stulz (1992) document “contagious” valuation effects of bankruptcy announcements within the same industry.  
Hertzel et al. (2008) show that bankruptcy filings generate wealth effects for suppliers and customers along the supply chain, 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621272
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Our findings will also help inform ongoing debates regarding conservatism’s continuing 
role as a pervasive feature and longstanding tenet of financial accounting.  In Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) defined conservatism as “a prudent reaction to uncertainty to ensure that uncertainty 
and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered” (FASB (1980), p. 10).  
This definition is consistent with conservatism being relevant to assessing bankruptcy risk.  
However, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) removed 
conservatism from their conceptual framework in 2010 for violating neutrality.3   In its 
exposure draft for the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (FASB (2008)), the 
FASB argued that conservatism may produce information asymmetries that reduce investor 
insights into future cash flows from growth options.  In contrast, Kothari et al. (2010) argue 
that the broader economic consequences of accounting standards are of first-order significance, 
while their role in equity valuation is of secondary significance. 
Recent studies that document differences between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism motivate our further examination of how they seperately relate to bankruptcy risk 
(Beaver and Ryan (2005), Qiang (2007), Ball et al. (2009)).  These studies observe that 
conservatism can arise either “unconditionally” via inherently conservative accounting 
principles or “conditionally” via a more timely recognition of bad versus good news.  Their 
evidence suggests that unconditional and conditional conservatism can play different roles in 
contracting, regulation, taxation, valuation and in reducing information asymmetries (Qiang 
(2007, 2008)), and that they are negatively (positively) correlated in the short (long) run 
(Beaver and Ryan (2005), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), Ball et al. (2009)).  They further 
suggest that auditors and regulators focus primarily on unconditional conservatism, litigation 
risk induces both, and that managers exercise more control over conditional conservatism, at 
least in the short run, preferring counter-conservative treatments for career advancement (Watts 
(2003), Qiang (2007), Kothari et al. (2010)). 
Our prediction that conservatism reduces subsequent bankruptcy risk is suggested by 
recent studies of its cash enhancing and informational properties.  Specifically, they find that 
accounting conservatism reduces cash outflows by mitigating capital overinvestment, reducing 
                                                                                                                                                     
and Jorion et al. (2009) provide evidence regarding credit contagions via counter-party effects, suggesting that borrowing 
firms’ bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increase credit default swap spreads among 
creditors. 
3 The FASB’s Conceptual Framework defines and describes basic concepts by which financial statements are prepared and 
identifies qualitative characteristics that make information in financial statements useful.  It serves as a guide to the Board in 
developing accounting standards and in resolving accounting issues not addressed directly by an existing standard.  The IASB 
has a corresponding Conceptual Framework.  These frameworks were combined into a unified set of accounting concepts and 
principles in SFAC No. 8 (FASB, 2010). 
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risk-shifting, delaying economic losses, promoting precautionary savings and lowering agency 
costs (Lara et al. (2010a), Callen et al. (2010b), Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan (2010), 
Srivastava and Tse (2010)).  Other recent studies find conservatism to increase cash inflows 
from operations by evoking more favorable terms from trading partners and by paring 
investment distortions (Hui et al. (2009b), Lara et al. (2010a), Bushman et al. (2010)).  These 
cash enhancing properties of conservatism reduce bankruptcy risk because bankruptcy is 
fundamentally a condition of cash insufficiency (Kim et al. (1993), Uhrig-Homburg (2005), 
Campbell et al. (2008)). 
Recent evidence also suggests that conservatism lessens information uncertainty and 
asymmetry via less optimistic reporting of net income and assets and the more timely reporting 
of bad news (Watts (2003), Guay and Verrecchia (2007)).  This informational role of 
conservatism enhances cash flows and reduces bankruptcy risk as better-informed investors 
and trading partners provide more favorable financing and contracting terms.  Under conditions 
of distress, conservatism facilitates negotiations and workouts among creditors, equity holders, 
trading partners, labor unions and other claimants, thus helping avoid bankruptcy filings 
(Giammarino (1989), Mooradian (1994)).  These cash-enhancing and informational properties 
of conservatism suggest negative causal relations between both unconditional and conditional 
conservatism and subsequent bankruptcy risk. 
That bankruptcy risk might in turn influence subsequent conservatism follows from the 
reasoning that higher bankruptcy risk induces conservative treatments that will enhance cash 
and reduce information uncertainty, thus reducing future bankruptcy risk.  As bankruptcy risk 
increases, auditors and regulators pay particular attention to unconditional conservatism as it is 
the major contributor to total conservatism, is easier to monitor, and is not bad-news-driven 
((Ryan (2006), Qiang (2007)).  In contrast, managers generally resist both unconditional and 
conditional conservatism to advance their careers, justify spending and portray more favorable 
performance, especially when bankruptcy risk increases, with their ability to do so stronger for 
conditional conservatism.  This interaction between auditors’ and regulators’ interests and 
managers’ career motives suggests that bankruptcy risk will be positively associated with 
subsequent unconditional conservatism and negatively associated with subsequent conditional 
conservatism. 
These predictions are tested using U.S. firm-year observations for the period 1989-2007 
with available data for unconditional and conditional conservatism, bankruptcy risk and control 
variables.  Two of the three bankruptcy risk measures are continuous ex ante estimates derived 
from Merton (1974) and Campbell et al. (2008), respectively, which permit tests of causal 
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relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk.  The third measure is an ex 
post discrete (zero-one) indicator of actual bankruptcy filings not subject to measurement error.  
Four measures of unconditional conservatism are considered:  total accruals (adapted from 
Ahmed and Duellman (2007)), rank of industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio (e.g., Ahmed et 
al. (2002), Zhang (2008)), hidden reserves (Penman and Zhang (2002)), and a factor score 
from a principal components analysis of the above three metrics.  Four measures of conditional 
conservatism are likewise examined:  accumulated non-operating accruals adapted from Zhang 
(2008), an extended measure of Khan and Watts (2009), a CR ratio measure adapted from 
Callen et al. (2010a), and a factor score from a principal component analysis of the above three 
metrics.  We mainly employ tri-variate VARX (1) and tri-variate VARX (3) models to examine 
causal relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk, extending Lara et al. (2009). 
Our main results confirm these predictions:  (1) Unconditional and conditional 
conservatism are negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk, consistent with 
conservatism’s cash enhancing and informational properties serving to mitigate bankruptcy 
risk, and (2) Bankruptcy risk is positively associated with subsequent unconditional 
conservatism, consistent with auditors’ and regulators’ interests, and negatively associated with 
subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with countervailing managerial incentives to 
withhold bad news to advance their careers.  These findings are similar for extremely 
distressed firms and for firms that actually declare bankruptcy. 
In further analyses using VARX models with interactions among conservatism, cash 
holdings and informational properties, we find that both the cash enhancing and informational 
roles of conservatism help mitigate bankruptcy risk. . We further find that auditor and regulator 
monitoring increases subsequent unconditional conservatism as bankruptcy risk rises.  These 
results are robust to endogeneity between unconditional and conditional conservatism, extreme 
distress, actual bankruptcy, conservatism gaming, debt contracting, earnings management, 
other control variables and alternative measures of unconditional and conditional conservatism 
and bankruptcy risk. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows:  Section 2 details the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the data and test methodologies.  Section 4 
presents empirical results and Section 5 concludes.  Appendices A and B examine relations 
among bankruptcy risk and alternate measures of unconditional and conservatism, respectively. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
Conservatism has been a characteristic of financial accounting for at least a millennium 
(Basu (2009)).  Figure 1 depicts the continuum along which firms evolve from financial health 
to bankruptcy.  Accounting conservatism, by definition, reduces net income and net assets but 
not cash flows and balances in itself.  Bankruptcy, by comparison, is fundamentally a condition 
of cash insufficiency.  Firms can operate indefinitely with reduced or even negative net income 
without entering either default (Figure 1, T = 2) or bankruptcy (Figure 1, T = 3), so long as 
cash arrives from some source to meet arising obligations.4  Conservatism operates in both the 
“health” and “distress” stages (Figure 1, T = 0, 1), as well as the “default” stage (Figure 1, T = 
2), to enhance cash and transparency regarding net assets and net income, thereby helping avert 
progressions into ultimate conditions of default or bankruptcy. 
2.1 The Cash Enhancing Role of Accounting Conservatism 
Prior studies suggest that accounting conservatism enhances cash availability by both 
increasing cash inflows and reducing cash outflows.  Conservatism increases cash inflows by 
promoting precautionary savings, reducing capital costs, alleviating underinvestment and 
increasing operating cash flows (OCF).  Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan (2010) argue 
analytically that prudent decision makers invoke conservative accounting to facilitate decisions 
regarding precautionary savings as future cash inflows become riskier, thereby increasing 
(reducing) cash holdings (expenditures).  Ahmed and Duellman (2002), Lara et al. (2010b) and 
Li (2010) document that conservatism lowers the cost of capital and facilitates external 
financing, thereby increasing reducing capital underinvestment and enhancing future OCF.5  
Hui et al. (2009b) argue that within some range, conservatism engenders more lenient 
contracting terms from suppliers, which has the effect of increasing OCF.  In a more general 
setting, BMS (2011) document that both unconditional and conditional conservatism mitigate 
future OCF downside risk. 
Conservatism reduces cash outflows by discouraging cash disbursements, reducing cash 
wastage and lowering agency costs associated with cash holdings.  By delaying net income and 
                                                
4 Whereas certain creditors monitor funds with broader definitions than cash such as working capital, they are ultimately 
interested in the cash that working capital provides.  Indeed, a firm with ample working capital can be bankrupt due to cash 
insufficiency if its working capital otherwise is illiquid.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that counter-conservatism can also 
contribute to financial distress.  As an illustration, before the 2009 financial crisis, AIG insured financial institutions but did 
not accrue related contingent liabilities.  When the financial crisis arose, AIG experienced large losses and would have been 
forced into bankruptcy without a government bailout.  Similarly, before 2007, subsequently bankrupt GM reported pension 
assets and liabilities as off-balance-sheet items under SFAS No. 87, rather than as contingent liabilities following SFAS No. 5, 
since before 2007, SFAS No. 87 allowed firms to report estimated net pension liabilities in footnotes to their financial 
statements as an exception to the more conservative treatment in SFAS No. 5. 
5  Ahmed and Duellman (2002) provide evidence that conservatism increases the debt ratings, thus lowering interest 
expenditures as confirmed by Zhang (2008).  Lara et al. (2010a) document that conservative accounting reduces the cost of 
equity capital.  Li (2010) reports that conservatism reduces the cost of both debt and equity capital in a cross-country setting. 
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net asset recognition, conservatism reduces or defers cash expenditures for performance-based 
compensation, taxes and dividends (Biddle (1980), Watts (2003), Callen et al. (2010b)).6  Lara 
et al. (2010b) argue that conditional conservatism increases managerial incentives to avoid 
suboptimal investments ex ante, and to abandon loss projects more quickly ex post (see also 
Srivastava and Tse (2010)).  Bushman et al. (2010) and Francis and Martin (2010) report that 
timely loss recognition curbs over-investment in cross-country and in acquisition settings, 
respectively, and Loktionov (2009) argues that in distressed firms, conditional conservatism 
reduces risk-shifting in investment projects by speeding up technical defaults.  Louis et al. 
(2009) document that timely loss recognition reduces value-destroying agency costs associated 
with increased cash holdings. 
Ultimately, conservatism’s cash enhancing role helps mitigate bankruptcy risk because 
bankruptcy is fundamentally a condition of cash insufficiency as suggested by theories and 
evidence in finance.  Kim et al. (1993), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Uhrig-Homburg 
(2005)) model bankruptcy as debt default triggered when cash flows available for payouts fall 
below required debt service payments.  Campbell et al. (2008) provide confirming evidence 
that prior cash holdings are negatively associated with default risk over various prediction 
horizons from one month to three years.  BMS (2011) provide evidence that both unconditional 
and conditional conservatism are positively associated with the level and upside potentials of 
cash holdings.  Conservatism’s cash enhancing role is further supplemented by its 
informational properties. 
2.2 The Informational Role of Accounting Conservatism 
Prior research suggests that unconditional and conditional conservatism play an 
informational role that reduces information uncertainties and asymmetries by constraining 
upward overstatement biases in net income and assets (Watts (2003), Li (2008)) and by 
revealing bad news in a timely fashion (Lafond and Watts (2008), Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2008)).  Guay and Verrecchia (2007) argue that disclosing lower-end realizations of firm 
value via ex ante commitments to conservative reporting promotes voluntary disclosures of 
higher-end realizations, thereby promoting fuller disclosures regarding cash flows and 
improving information precision.  Gox et al. (2009) argue that impairment rules, a type of 
conditional conservatism, increase information precision.  Watts (2003) and Qiang (2008) 
suggest that both unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce information asymmetry 
between firms and investors regarding asset values.  Hui et al. (2009a) find both unconditional 
                                                
6 Biddle (1980) and Callen et al. (2010b) provide evidence that LIFO firms reduce taxes by adopting and subsequently 
managing inventories, and that conservatism discourages or defers dividend payouts, respectively. 
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and conditional conservatism to substitute for managerial forecasts in reducing information 
asymmetry and information uncertainty. 
This informational role of accounting conservatism reduces bankruptcy risk indirectly by 
supplementing its cash-enhancing role.  By reducing information uncertainties and 
asymmetries, conservatism reduces adverse selection costs and risks to investors, and the cost 
of equity and debt capital, thereby increasing cash availability from external sources when 
firms approach default (Figure 1, Stages 0, 1, and 2).  For firms that have entered into 
conditions of distress (Figure 1, Stages 1 and 2), the informational properties of conservatism 
help avert rightward progressions into bankruptcy by encouraging creditors, other capital 
providers and the borrowing firm to work more cooperatively with each other to avoid a 
bankruptcy filing, at least in the case of unconditional conservatism.  Finance theories concur 
that less information asymmetry facilitates debt renegotiations and reduces bankruptcy filings.  
In particular, lower information asymmetry stimulates bargaining and multiple reorganization 
plans (Carapeto (2005)), private debt renegotiations (Chen (2003)) and bankruptcy filings by 
creditors (Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian (1994)).  Thus, conservatism’s informational 
role allows capital providers to be more confident regarding firms’ financial conditions and 
more willing to renegotiate debts and terms, thereby reducing the need for default resolution 
via bankruptcy filings (Figure 1, Stage 3). 
Both the cash enhancing and informational roles of accounting conservatism suggest that 
unconditional and conditional conservatism lower subsequent bankruptcy risk by increasing 
cash holdings and flows and by facilitating the avoidance of formal bankruptcy filings by firms 
in financial distress.  This reasoning leads to the prediction that both unconditional and 
conditional conservatism will be negatively related to subsequent bankruptcy risk: 
H1a. Unconditional conservatism is negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk. 
H1b. Conditional conservatism is negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk. 
2.3 Relations between Bankruptcy Risk and Subsequent Accounting Conservatism 
If unconditional and conditional conservatism influence subsequent bankruptcy risk as 
predicted by hypotheses H1a and H1b, it follows that bankruptcy risk may influence 
subsequent conservatism.  In this sense, changes in unconditional and conditional conservatism 
are natural responses to changes in firms’ risk dimensions that are facilitated by flexibility in 
applying generally accepted accounting principles.  However, the influences of bankruptcy risk 
on subsequent conservatism may differ between unconditional and conditional conservatism 
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due to the countervailing interests of auditors, regulators and managers.7  Auditors and 
regulators generally prefer more conservatism, especially unconditional conservatism because, 
as Qiang (2007) argues, they focus more on unconditional than conditional conservatism 
because it is a major contributor to total conservatism (Ryan 2006), easier to assess via routine 
audits, and is not conditioned on bad news “shocks” that auditors and regulators wish to avoid 
responsibility for, especially as bankruptcy risk increases.  Under these conditions, managers 
thus face higher disciplinary costs for not applying unconditional conservatism including job 
loss, legal sanctions, regulatory penalties, embarrassment and loss of reputation for “book 
cooking.”  These interactions between auditor and regulator monitoring and mangers’ motives 
suggest a positive relation between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional conservatism. 
Managers generally prefer less conservatism because it constrains their pursuit of career 
advancement, compensation, perquisites, pet investments, and other opportunistic activities.  
Managers in distressed firms in particular have strong incentives to overstate earnings and 
withhold bad news, at least until performance improves or they secure alternative employment 
(Kothari et al. (2009), Kothari et al. (2010)), and conditional conservatism accords them 
relatively greater discretion to do so (Qiang (2007), Kothari et al. (2010)).  Auditors and 
regulators on their part are disinclined to “bad news” shocks associated with conditional 
conservatism that are also costly to continually monitor (Qiang (2007)).  Thus, as bankruptcy 
risk increases, heightened attention by auditors and regulators to unconditional conservatism 
will motivate managers toward conditional counter-conservatism over which they have greater 
control, thus implying the following hypotheses: 
H2a. Bankruptcy risk is positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism. 
H2b. Bankruptcy risk is negatively associated with subsequent conditional conservatism. 
3. Data, Measures and Models 
3.1 Data 
This study utilizes a pooled sample of firm-year observations from NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ for fiscal years 1989 through 2007 with data obtained from Compustat, CRSP and 
the Federal Reserve Bank Reports.  Ex ante bankruptcy risk measures EDF from Merton (1974) 
and Campbell following Campbell et al. (2008), are estimated using CRSP and Compustat data.  
An ex-post bankruptcy risk measure indicating actual bankruptcy, BANK, is obtained from 
www.bankruptcydata.com.  Firm-year observations with missing values for conservatism, 
                                                
7 Qiang (2007) documents that litigation risk is positively associated with both unconditional and conditional conservatism and 
thus would not in itself motivate distinguishing between them. 
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bankruptcy risk, stock price, total assets or net income before extraordinary items are omitted.  
Since young firms as more prone to bankruptcy, we set a minimum data requirement for 
accrual-based conservatism measures of two years and employ one-lag specifications for 
VARX models, so that only firms with less than three-year histories are excluded.  We omit 
post-bankruptcy firm-year observations for firms filing under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code since these observations may be incomparable with pre-bankruptcy data.  To 
reduce the effects of outliers, observations in the top and bottom 1% of the major variables are 
winsorised, and firms in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded.  The final 
sample is comprised of 34,897 firm-year observations for 4,621 firms. 
3.2 Measures for Bankruptcy Risk 
Bankruptcy risk is defined as the probability that a firm will liquidate under Chapter 7 or 
reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which are triggered when firms 
cannot service cash obligations.  From among various structural and restrictive form 
bankruptcy risk models we employ Merton’s (1974) EDF measure and a score derived from 
Campbell et al. (2008) based on their predictive ability and freedom of estimation bias caused 
by accounting conservatism versus other models (e.g., Altman’s (1968) Z-score, Olson’s (1980) 
O-score and Zmijewski’s (1984) Z-score).  Both EDF and Campbell are ex ante bankruptcy 
risk measures.  We also examine actual bankruptcy, BANK, an ex post measure with no 
estimation error. 
EDF.  EDF is the probability that firm’s asset value will fall below its liabilities after T 
years (T = one year in this study), assuming that the firm’s asset value (continuous rate of 
growth in assets) is log-normally (normally) distributed.  Merton’s (1974) option-based 
structural model expresses a firm’s market value (VE) as a call option on the firm’s assets (VA), 
with a strike price equal to the face value of debt, and time to expiration equal to T.  Applying 
the Black and Scholes (1973) formula and Ito’s lemma, we estimate EDF as: 
EDFt = prob{-[ln(VA,t / Xt) + (µ - 0.5σA2)T] / (σAT1/2) ≥ εt+T} (1) 
= N(-(ln(VA,t / Xt) + (µ - 0.5σA2)T) / (σAT1/2)), 
where N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, X is the face 
value of a firm’s debt, σA is the volatility of a firm’s assets, and µ is the instantaneous drift 
assuming the firm’s market value follows geometric Brownian motion.  EDF’s intuition is that 
the probability that a firm’s assets are insufficient to pay the face value of its debt increases 
with the firm’s debt and asset volatility, and decreases with the firm’s assets. 
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Merton’s (1974) model assumes market efficiency and complete information.8  In this 
study we relax this assumption, allowing accounting conservatism to impact EDF via an 
accounting input the leverage ratio.  If conservatism facilitates external financing and thereby 
increases the leverage ratio and strike price in the Merton (1974) model, this may lead to an 
overestimate of EDFt.  However, this bias is not a serious issue since it runs counter to the 
predictions of all hypotheses except H2a.  Thus, if H1a, H1b and H2b are supported, the true 
relations would be stronger than observed. 
Campbell.  Campbell is the ranked probability of a firm declaring bankruptcy one month 
ahead.  It is estimated quarterly by a logit model using stock market and quarterly accounting 
variables following the formula in the last column of Table III in Campbell et al. (2008).  We 
employ the Campbell estimate for the final fiscal quarter in our tests, as follows: 
Campbellt = exp(tempt) / (1 +exp(tempt)) (2) 
where tempt = -9.08 - 29.67 * NIMTAVGt + 3.36 * TLMTAt - 7.35 * EXRETAVGt + 1.48 * 
SIGMAt + 0.082 * Rsizet - 2.40 * CASHHMTAt + 0.054 * MBt - 0.937 * PRICEt.  Campbell‘s 
intuition is that bankruptcy risk decreases with the predictability of market-based profitability 
(NIMTAVG), the predictability of excess return relative to S&P 500 index (EXRETAVG), the 
market-based liquidity ratio (CASHHMTA) and the stock price (PRICE).  Bankruptcy risk 
increases with the market-based leverage ratio (TLMTA), stock return volatility (SIGMA), the 
market-to-book equity ratio (MB) and firm size relative to that of the S&P 500 index (Rsize). 
In comparison to Merton (1974) model, the assumptions underlying the restrictive form 
logit model for Campbell are more relaxed; for example, it allows market inefficiency and 
information asymmetry between creditors and the firm, and short-term default that can occur 
before net asset values breach bankruptcy barriers.9  Accounting conservatism could bias 
Campbell upward to some degree by understating net income (NIMTAVGt) and the liquidity 
ratio (CASHHMTAt) and by overstating total liabilities (TLMTAt).  However, this bias in 
Campbell, runs counter to the predictions of all hypotheses except H2a, implying true relations 
stronger than observed for H1a, H1b and H2b. 
BANK.  BANK is an indicator equal to one if a firm files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 
or 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and zero otherwise.  In contrast to EDF and Campbell, 
                                                
8 Other relevant assumptions include:  (1) creditors and managers have symmetric information about firm value and can 
observe the inputs into the model, (2) default occurs when a firm’s asset value drops below its debt obligations at the time of 
maturity, (3) the default barrier is the exogenously determined fixed face value of debt, and (4) the asset value follows a 
diffusion process without jumps. 
9Other relevant assumptions include:  (1) default time is unobservable and no longer tied to firm value falling below a pre-
specified default barrier, (2) default follows an intensity-based process (e.g. Poisson/Cox process) with exogenous latent 
variables, (3) the probability of default is logistically distributed, i.e., the cumulative probability of default takes a logistic 
functional form. 
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which are ex-ante metrics, BANK is an ex-post bankruptcy risk measure that is free of 
estimation error and conservatism bias.  However, the subsample of firms that actually declare 
bankruptcy is much smaller and may not be representative of all firms along a bankruptcy risk 
continuum.  Moreover, BANK does not support an examination of continuous relations 
between conservatism and bankruptcy risk, and because data may not exist or be comparable 
following the declaration of bankruptcy, BANK does not facilitate the testing of causal 
relationships between bankruptcy and subsequent unconditional and conditional conservatism.  
We therefore use EDF and Campbell in our main tests. 
3.3 Measures for Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism 
Givoly et al. (2007) advise using multiple conservatism measures because they capture 
different aspects of conservatism, some with estimation error.  Hence, we examine four firm-
year measures of unconditional conservatism:  UC_ACC (total accruals as adapted from 
Ahmed and Duellman (2007)), UC_BM (rank of industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio), 
UC_RES (hidden reserves), and UC_PCA (a factor score from a principal components analysis 
of the above three metrics).  We likewise examine four firm-year measures of conditional 
conservatism:  CC_AR (extending Khan and Watts (2009)), CC_CR (extending Callen et al. 
(2010a)), CC_ACM (accumulated non-operational accruals extending Zhang (2008)), and 
CC_PCA (a factor score from a principal components analysis of the above three metrics), as 
described below. 
UC_ACC.  A proxy for unconditional conservatism equal to negative one times the ratio 
of average total accruals before depreciation to average total assets, both averaged over three-
year periods ending with the current year.  Higher total accruals indicate a higher degree of 
unconditional conservatism by the rationale that conservatism results in persistently negative 
accruals (Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ahmed and Duellman (2007)).  We calculate total accruals 
as:  Total accrualsit = net income before extraordinary itemsit (Compustat IB) - operational 
cash flowit (Compustat OANCF) + depreciation expenseit (Compustat DP). 
UC_BM.  A proxy for unconditional conservatism measured as the industry-adjusted 
ranking of the product of negative one times the ratio of book value to market value of 
common shareholders' equity (Ahmed and Duellman (2007), Zhang (2008)).  As UC_BM also 
reflects expected economic rents and future growth opportunities, we use R&D intensity to 
control for them following Ahmed and Duellman (2007). 
UC_RES.  A proxy for unconditional conservatism reflected in “hidden” reserves related 
to advertising (ADV), research and development (RD) and last-in-first-out inventory 
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accounting (INV).  Extending Penman and Zhang (2002), this study measures UC_RES as the 
ratio of hidden reserves to total assets (TA):  UC_RESt = (INVtres + RDtres + ADVtres) / TAt.10 
UC_PCA.  A proxy for unconditional conservatism measured as the factor score 
generated from a principal components analysis of the three unconditional conservatism 
measures UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES.  UC_PCA reflects commonalities across these 
three measures, each with their strengths and weaknesses for measuring UC.  Specifically, 
UC_ACC is an accrual-based metric that does not capture non-accrual unconditional 
conservatism such as R&D and advertising expenditures.  UC_BM is a market-based metric 
that reflects the understatement of book value relative to market value, as well as expected 
economic rents and future growth opportunities.  UC_RES captures only unconditional 
conservatism related to hidden reserves.  Applying this reasoning, we employ UC_PCA as the 
primary measure of unconditional conservatism in our main empirical tests. 
CC_AR.  A proxy for conditional conservatism defined as the ratio of the sum of the C 
Score and G Score to G Score from Khan and Watts (2009), a measure of asymmetric response 
that derives from Basu (1997).  Our sampling period, 1989 through 2007, is similar to that 
examined in Khan and Watts (2009), 1963 through 2005, and our sample size is likewise 
similar.  We use model 2 in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) to estimate CC_ARit = 
(C_Scoreit + G_Scoreit) / G_Scoreit = 1 + C_Scoreit / G_Scoreit. where G_Scoreit = m1 + 
m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4 LEVit = 0.237 - 0.033*Sizei - 0.007*M/Bit + 0.033*LEVit and 
C_Scoreit = l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit = 0.031 + 0.005*Sizeit - 0.006*M/Bit + 
0.005*LEVit. 
CC_CR.  A proxy for conditional conservatism extending Callen et al. (2010a).  We 
estimate CC_CR as the ratio of current earnings shocks to total earnings news for bad earnings 
news, with the ratio multiplied by -1 for good earnings news.11  This definition differs from the 
CR ratio in Callen et al. (2010a) in four respects:  (1) CC_CR uses the indirect method to 
estimate earnings news as in Vuolteenaho (2002), (2) CC_CR multiplies the CR ratio by -1 for 
good earnings news, so that higher CC_CR represents greater conditional conservatism for the 
good news case, (3) negative observations of CC_CR are not deleted from the sample, (4) 
intercepts are added to the VAR (1) model for estimating CC_CR. 
                                                
10 INVitres is the LIFO reserve, RDitres is calculated using coefficients in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) to capitalize and amortize 
R&D, ADVitres is advertising expense capitalized and amortized over two years following Bublitz and Ettredge (1989).  
Penman and Zhang (2002) use net operating assets as the deflator for hidden reserves, but since its value is negative for over 
one-sixth of our sample, which would potentially bias estimated hidden reserves, we use total assets as the deflator.  When data 
are missing for LIFO reserves, R&D expensing and advertisement expensing, they are set to zero. 
11 Whereas CC_AR derives from Basu (1997), and its criterion for classifying good versus bad news is whether the associated 
stock return is positive or negative, CC_CR derives from Vuolteenaho (2002), and its criterion for classifying good versus bad 
news is whether ROE, earnings scaled by book equity, is greater than the risk-free rate.  Additional details regarding the 
estimation of CC_AR and CC_CR are available on request. 
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CC_ACM.  A proxy for conditional conservatism measured as negative one times the 
ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals over a three-year period to accumulated total 
assets, and is adapted from Zhang (2008).  A higher value for CC_ACM indicates a higher 
level of bad news reported via non-operational accruals.  Non-operating accruals are calculated 
as follows:  Nonoperating accruals = Total accruals12 - Δaccounts receivable (Compustat 
RECT) - Δinventories (Compustat INVT) - Δprepaid expenses (Compustat XPP) + Δaccounts 
payable (Compustat AP) + Δtaxes payable (Compustat TXT). 
CC_PCA.  A proxy for conditional conservatism measured as the factor score generated 
from a principal components analysis of the three conditional conservatism measures CC_AR, 
CC_CR and CC_ACM.  CC_PCA captures commonalities among these three metrics, each 
with different strengths and weaknesses.  Specifically, CC_AR and CC_CR are both market-
based metrics subject to noise from voluntary disclosures of accounting and non-accounting 
information.  CC_AR employs accounting measures that may correlate with bankruptcy risk 
metrics EDF and Campbell.  CC_ACM is an accrual-based metric that captures both bad news 
in accruals and “big baths” resulting from earnings manipulations and investment accruals.  
Therefore, we employ CC_PCA as the primary measure of conditional conservatism in the 
main tests. 
3.4 Estimation Models and Methods 
Following Lara et al. (2009), we employ VARX (vector autoregressive with exogenous 
variables) models to test causal relationships between the two types of conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk.  VARX models are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), 
which improves efficiency when estimating systems of equations with correlated random errors 
by controlling for cross-equation correlations and when cross-equational error terms are small 
they approximate OLS.  Because prior studies (e.g., Ryan (2006)) suggest that unconditional 
and conditional conservatism can be substitutes to some degree, we use a tri-variate VARX (1) 
model consisting of equations (3) to (5) to examine the causal relations between unconditional 
and conditional conservatism and bankruptcy while controlling for the endogeneity between 
the two types of conservatism, wherein hypotheses H1a, H2a, H1b and H2b predict γ11 < 0, δ11 
< 0, β21 > 0 and β31 < 0, respectively: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + Controlst + ε11 (3) 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + Controlst + ε21 (4) 
                                                
12 Zhang (2008) uses the term “operational accrual”, but this term matches the definition of total accruals used in Ahmed et al. 
(2007).  Following Zhang (2008), when cash flow from operations is not available, total accruals are calculated as follows:   
Total accruals = net income (Compustat NI) + depreciation (Compustat DP) - funds from operations (Compustat FOPT) + 
Δcurrent assets (Compustat ACT) - Δdebt (Compustat DLC) - Δcurrent liabilities (Compustat LCT) - Δcash (Compustat CHE).  
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CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + Controlst + ε31 (5) 
where BR refers to bankruptcy risk measures EDF or Campbell and the autoregressive vector 
includes BRt-1, UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1.  Controlst in equation (3) include previously 
identified determinants of bankruptcy risk (Anderson et al. (1996), Shumway (2001), Parker et 
al. (2002), Uhrig-Homburg (2005), Campbell et al. (2008), Eberhart et al. (2008)), namely, the 
leverage ratio (Leveraget), return on total assets (ROAt), return volatility (STD_Rett), firm size 
(Ln(MV)t), the risk-free rate (Ratet), liquidity (Casht), changes in liquidity (ΔCasht), and R&D 
investment intensity (Inten_RDt).   Consistent with Shumway (2001), Uhrig-Homburg (2004), 
Campbell et al. (2008) and Eberhart et al. (2008), this study predicts bankruptcy risk to be 
positively associated with leverage and return volatility and negatively associated with ROA, 
liquidity, cash flow, firm size and the risk-free rate and R&D investment intensity. 
Controlst in equation (4) include previously identified determinants of unconditional 
conservatism, namely, the leverage ratio (Leveraget), firm size (Ln(MV)t) and R&D investment 
intensity (Inten_RDt).13  These variables proxy for demand for unconditional conservatism 
arising from contracting considerations, litigation risk, taxation and regulation, while 
investment intensity Inten_RDt is used to control for the effects of R&D investment and growth 
opportunities (Ahmed and Duellman (2007)).  Controlst in equation (5) are the same as in 
equation (4), but with different predictions.14  Lastly, in all the three equations, dummies for 
the Fama and French (1997) industry classification (Ind_Dum) and fiscal year (Year_Dum) are 
included to capture fixed industry and year effects. 
Because VARX estimation is sensitive to lag structure, with short lags risking wasted 
information and biased parameters and long lags risking unrepresentative estimates, we employ 
the following VARX(3) model to test hypotheses H1a, H2a, H1b and H2b: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + β12BRt-2 + β13BRt-3 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + γ12UC_PCAt-2 (6) 
+ γ13UC_PCAt-3 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + δ12CC_PCAt-2 + δ13CC_PCAt-3 + Controlst + ε11 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + β22BRt-2 + β23BRt-3 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 +γ22UC_PCAt-2 (7) 
                                                
13 We predict unconditional conservatism to be negatively related with Leverage and ROA, and positively related with firm size.  
Beaver and Ryan (2000) document that leverage is negatively associated with unconditional conservatism because firms with 
high levels of leverage tend to have greater conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.  As ROA increases, firms have 
less pressure to use unconditionally counter-conservatism to boost earnings.  Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) suggest that 
firm size proxies for political visibility and because larger firms are more visible, they are subject to higher tax and regulation 
costs and they are more subject to litigation risk, and Ahmed et al. (2002) document that firm size is positively associated with 
the unconditional conservatism metrics BM ratio and total accruals. 
14 We predict conditional conservatism to be positively related to Leverage but negatively related to firm size and ROA.  
Creditors preferring conditional conservatism will have increasing influence over firms as financial leverage increases, 
especially for firms in financial distress.  Well-performing firms have less pressure to use conditional counter-conservatism to 
boost earnings.  Khan and Watts (2009) suggest that larger firms have richer information environments that reduce both overall 
uncertainty and information asymmetries and thus contracting demand for conditional conservatism; Givoly et al. (2007) and 
LaFond and Watts (2008) similarly document that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings for large firms is significantly smaller 
than for small firms. 
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+ γ23UC_PCAt-3 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + δ22CC_PCAt-2 + δ23CC_PCAt-3 + Controlst + ε21 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + β32BRt-2 + β33BRt-3 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + γ32UC_PCAt-2 (8) 
+ γ33UC_PCAt-3 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + δ32CC_PCAt-2 + δ33CC_PCAt-3 + Controlst + ε31 
where BR refers to bankruptcy risk measures EDF or Campbell, and the autoregressive vector 
includes the one- to three- period lags of BR, UC_PCA and CC_PCA.  Controls used in 
equations (6) to (8) are the same as those used in equations (3) to (5) wherein H1a predicts γ11 
+ γ12 + γ13 < 0, H2a predicts δ11 + δ12 + δ13 < 0, H1b predicts β21 + β22 + β23 >0, and H2b 
predicts β31 + β32 + β33 <0.  We further employ the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to 
identity an optimal lag structure, a goodness of fit measure for estimated models that considers 
both precision and complexity.  It is not a hypothesis test but a tool for model selection.  For a 
given dataset, the competing model with the lowest AIC is considered to have the best fit. 
We do not use first-order differencing since Dickey-Fuller tests reveal the major testing 
variables to be stationary, and when there is no unit root, first-order differencing can generate 
biased coefficient estimates in VARX models.  Sims (1980) and Doan (1992) argue that 
differencing should not be used even if the variables contain a unit root (i.e., are non-
stationary), since the goal of VAR analysis is to determine the inter-relationships among 
variables, and differencing can destroy information concerning data co-movements.  We 
perform the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the unbalanced panel data in this study by running 
the following regression model for the pooled panel data:  ?yt = δyt-1 + εit, where ?yt  is the 
first differencing of y.  Then we test the hypothesis H0:  δ = 0.  F-statistics indicate that the 
major testing variables are stationary at least at the 99% confidence level, with results available 
on request. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics (Panel A) and correlation matrices (Panel B) for test 
variables.  In Panel A, the mean of EDF, 0.0365, is close to its value reported in Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) of 0.0420.  The mean of UC_ACC, -0.0012, is lower than in Ahmed et al. (2002), 
0.003, and in Ahmed and Duellman (2007), 0.010, with this difference likely due to differing 
sample periods.  Ahmed et al. (2002) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) use samples of S&P 
500 firms during 1993-1998 and 1998-2002, respectively, whereas this study uses NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ listed firms for 1989-2007.  The mean of CC_CR is -0.3102, much 
lower than the CR ratio in Callen et al. (2010a); however, these values are not comparable 
since the CR ratio in Callen et al. (2010a) omits observations with negative values, whereas the 
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CC_CR measure in this study does not. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Panel B of Table 1 presents correlations among contemporaneous observations of the test 
variables, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations reported in the upper (lower) triangle of the 
table.  The Spearman (Pearson) correlations between the bankruptcy risk metrics EDF and 
Campbell are 0.7789 (0.7789), both statistically significant, suggesting that they have strong 
convergent validity in measuring ex ante bankruptcy risk.  Both of these ex ante measures are 
also significantly positively correlated with the ex post bankruptcy risk measure BANK. 
UC_PCA is significantly negatively associated with CC_PCA, with a Spearman (Pearson) 
correlation -0.1441 (-0.0637).  Except for CC_ACM, Spearman correlations among other 
component measures of the two types of conservatism are predominantly negative, a finding 
consistent with prior evidence (Beaver and Ryan (2005), Ryan (2006), Roychowdhury and 
Watts (2007), Ball et al. (2009)).  Spearman and Pearson correlations between UC_PCA and its 
component unconditional conservatism metrics are uniformly positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that UC_PCA possesses content and convergent validity.  Spearman and 
Pearson correlations between CC_PCA and its component conditional conservatism metrics are 
likewise uniformly positive and statistically significant, the only exception being its Pearson 
correlation with CC_ACM, which is insignificantly different from zero.  These correlations 
suggest that CC_PCA possesses convergent validity.  The Spearman and Pearson correlations 
among the three component measures of unconditional and conditional conservatism are within 
the range of +/-0.10 respectively.  This does not mean that they lack convergent validity since 
they measure conservatism from different aspects.15 
Pearson and Spearman correlations of unconditional conservatism with EDF and 
Campbell are negative, whereas the correlations of conditional conservatism with EDF and 
Campbell are positive.  Care should be taken in interpreting these latter correlations because 
they are subject to omitted variable biases.  In the following sections, we systematically 
examine the lead-lag relations between unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism, 
and bankruptcy risk using multivariate analyses. 
                                                
15 A measure possesses convergent validity when it is positively correlated with another measure for the same concept.  
However, alternative measures can have a low or even negative correlation if they measure the concept from different aspects.  
For example, when measuring unconditional conservatism using hidden reserves (UC_RES) and an accrual-based measure 
(UC_ACC), UC_ACC and UC_RES could be negatively correlated; firms with higher-level reserves may have lower 
incentives to use accruals to increase unconditional conservatism. 
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4.2 Causal Relations Between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
Bankruptcy Risk in Full and Extremely Distressed Samples 
We first examine the lead-lag relations between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism using a tri-variate VARX (1) model described by equations (3) to (5), with results 
for the full sample and subsample of firms in extreme distress presented in Table 2, Panels A 
and B, respectively.  Models 1 and 2 in both Panels use EDFt and Campbellt as bankruptcy risk 
measures, respectively.  Panel A of Table 2 finds UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 to be significantly 
negatively associated with EDFt and Campbellt, with coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.0431 (-8.82) 
and -0.0083 (-15.05) for EDFt, respectively, and -0.0184 (-3.65) and -0.0110 (-19.38) for 
Campbellt, respectively.  F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients of 
EDFt and Campbellt are zero indicate rejection beyond the 99% confidence level.  EDFt-1 and 
Campbellt-1 are both significantly positively associated with UC_PCAt and negatively 
associated with CC_PCAt, with coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0389 (13.61) and -0.2865 (-8.01), 
respectively, for UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 for EDFt, and 0.0388 (14.16) and -0.4431 (-12.95), 
respectively, for Campbellt.  These results lend support to hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b, 
after controlling for endogeneity between unconditional and conditional conservatism. 16  
Untabulated results reveal qualitatively similar findings as those for H1a and H1b above for 
contemporaneous associations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk.  Specifically, both unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively 
related to concurrent bankruptcy risk for the full sample (results available on request). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
For extremely distressed firms, managerial incentives and governance mechanisms may 
differ from those in healthier firms, which may qualitatively change relations between 
conservatism and bankruptcy risk for several reasons.  When shareholders’ implicit call options 
on assets are at or close to the money in deeply distressed firms, equity values will increase in 
asset volatility, shareholders’ risk-shifting incentives may dominate and firms may have less 
incentive to use conservatism to mitigate bankruptcy risk.  Firms’ control rights also may 
progressively transfer to creditors, who may demand higher levels of conservatism to prevent 
risk shifting to creditors and wealth transferring to shareholders (Loktionov (2009)).  Finally, 
                                                
16  In both models, conditional conservatism CC_PCAt-1 exhibits a significant positive association with subsequent 
unconditional conservatism UC_PCAt, with coefficients (t-statistics) 0.0021 (5.17) and 0.0019 (4.67), respectively in Panel A.  
This result is consistent with expectation and suggests that bad news “shocks” associated with conditional conservatism 
generate demand for subsequent unconditional conservatism.  UC_PCAt-1 also exhibits a positive association with subsequent 
conditional conservatism CC_PCAt, with coefficients (t-statistics) 0.0940 (2.12) and 0.0571 (1.29), respectively.  However, 
when we take the first difference of UC_PCA to consider only the unconditional conservatism that occurred in a specific fiscal 
year, the coefficient is significantly negative.  This result is consistent with prior findings that unconditional conservatism 
preempts conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Ryan (2006)). 
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the going concern assumption may no longer apply, making accrual accounting and 
unconditional conservatism less relevant.  To investigate whether the results for the full sample 
hold under these conditions, we examine in Panel B of Table 5 a subsample of most distressed 
firms defined by the lowest decile of returns-on-assets (largest (-ROA)).  Consistent with the 
results in Panel A, both UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 remain significantly negatively associated 
with subsequent bankruptcy risk, except for UC_PCAt-1 with Campbellt.  EDFt-1 and 
Campbellt-1 remain significantly and positively associated with UC_PCAt, and CC_PCAt, 
except for EDFt-1 with CC_PCAt.  Thus, the prior findings are qualitatively similar for deeply 
distressed firms. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
To address possible concerns that our results are influenced by cross-sectional relations 
between unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk or that our 
results are sensitive to lag structure, we examine relations between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism using a tri-variate VARX (3) model described by equations (6) to (8).  
Results for the full sample are presented in Table 3 where Model 1 finds UC_PCAt-1, 
UC_PCAt-2 and UC_PCAt-3 to be consistently negatively associated with EDFt, with the 
coefficient for UC_PCAt-1 statistically significant.  Model 2 finds UC_PCAt-1 to be 
significantly negatively associated with EDFt, and UC_PCAt-2 and UC_PCAt-3 to be positively 
associated with EDFt, with the coefficient for UC_PCAt-2 statistically significant.  The sums of 
the coefficients of UC_PCAt-1, UC_PCAt-2 and UC_PCAt-3 are all negative, and the F-statistics 
for the null hypothesis that the sum is zero is 72.10 and 18.48 for EDFt and Campbellt, 
respectively, thus providing strong support for H1a.  In both models, CC_PCAt-1, CC_PCAt-2 
and CC_PCAt-3 are significantly and negatively associated with EDFt and Campbellt, and F-
statistics for the null hypotheses that the sums of the coefficients of CC_PCAt-1, CC_PCAt-2 
and CC_PCAt-3 are zero for EDFt and Campbellt are likewise significant beyond the 99% 
confidence level, thus providing strong support for H1b. 
In Model 1, EDFt-1, EDFt-2 and EDFt-3 are significantly positively associated with 
UC_PCAt, and likewise in Model 2, Campbellt-1, Campbellt-2 and Campbellt-3 are consistently 
positively associated with UC_PCAt, but only the coefficient of Campbellt-1 is statistically 
significant.  F-statistics for the null hypotheses that the sums of the coefficients of EDFt-1, 
EDFt-2 and EDFt-3 and of Campbellt-1, Campbellt-2 and Campbellt-3 are zero indicate rejection at 
least at the 99% confidence level, thus providing strong support for H2a that bankruptcy risk is 
positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism.  Results for testing H2b are 
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weaker.  In Model 1, EDFt-1 is significantly negatively associated with CC_PCAt and EDFt-2 
and EDFt-3 are significantly positively associated with CC_PCAt, but the sum of their 
coefficients is negative, and the same pattern applies to Campbellt-1, Campbellt-2 and 
Campbellt-3 in CC_PCAt equation in Model 2.  F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the sum 
of the coefficients of EDFt-1, EDFt-2 and EDFt-3 is zero indicates rejection beyond the 99% 
confidence level in Model 1, but for the sum of the coefficients of Campbellt-1, Campbellt-2 and 
Campbellt-3 is insignificant, thus providing limited support for H2b that bankruptcy risk is 
negatively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism. 
We further compare the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the corresponding 
VARX (1) and VARX (3) models used in Tables 2 and 3 to examine the optimal lag structure.  
AIC is calculated as AIC = N*Ln((1 - R-sqr) / N) + 2K, where N is sample size, K is number is 
independent variables, and R-sqr is the proportion of the sum of square accounted for by the 
model under consideration.  The last two lines of Table 3 indicate that AIC numbers for VARX 
(1) models are consistently smaller than for VARX (3) models whereas untabulated results 
indicate smaller AIC numbers for VARX (1) models than for corresponding VARX (2) models.  
Since lower AIC numbers indicate better fit, we use VARX (1) model in subsequent empirical 
tests.  To address the whether results are similar for each complement of UC_PCA and 
CC_PCA, we present robustness tests for unconditional and conditional conservatism 
components in Appendix A and B respectively, with qualitatively consistent findings. 
4.3 Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Actual 
Bankruptcies 
Examining a subsample of firms that actually declared bankruptcy eliminates estimation 
error in estimating bankruptcy risk while precluding tests for the effects of bankruptcy on 
subsequent conservatism.  For this reason, we test only hypotheses H1a and H2a for bankrupt 
firms using a logit model following Campbell et al. (2008), where H1a and H2a predict γ < 0: 
BANKt = α + γCONt-1 + Controlst + µt (9) 
where BANK equals one if a firm files for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 or 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and zero otherwise, and CON refers to unconditional or conditional 
conservatism measured by UC_PCA or CC_PCA, or both.  Controlst include the following 
commonly used determinants of bankruptcy risk mainly identified in Campbell et al. (2008):  
the market-based profitability (NIMTAVG), the predictability of excess return relative to S&P 
500 index (EXRETAVG), R&D investment intensity (Inten_RD), firm size relative to that of the 
S&P 500 index (Rsize), the stock price (PRICE) and the risk-free rate (Rate), which are 
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expected to reduce the probability of BANK; the leverage ratio (Leverage), the liquidity ratio 
(Cash), changes in the liquidity ratio (ΔCash), return volatility (STD_Ret) and the market-to-
book equity ratio (MB), which are expected to increase the probability of BANK.  Other 
controlling variables include year and industry dummies, earnings management (Emgmt) and 
earnings smoothing (Esmooth). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 reports the estimation results.  Models 1 and 3 to 5 in Table 4 find UC_PCAt-1  to 
be significantly negatively associated with the probability that firms file for bankruptcy, a 
result that holds after controlling for earnings management and earnings smoothing.  However, 
CC_PCAt-1 is insignificantly associated with the probability of bankruptcy in Models 2 to 5.  
These results strongly confirm hypothesis H1a, but do not support hypothesis H2a for firms 
actually filing for bankruptcy.  This is consistent with reduced incentives for conditional 
conservatism as firms enter into actual bankruptcy, perhaps because bad news is already 
revealed and further bad news is unhelpful for reducing information asymmetries and could 
even cause frictions among claimants.  The signs of the control variable coefficients are 
consistent with expectations:  NIMTAVG, Exretavg, Inten_RD, Cash and Rate are negatively 
associated with BANK, and Leverage, STD_ret and MB are positively associated with BANK. 
4.4 The Cash Enhancing and Informational Roles of Accounting Conservatism and 
Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
This section examines how unconditional and conditional conservatism impact 
bankruptcy risk via their cash enhancing and informational roles.  Table 5 replicates Table 3, 
adding interactions between UC_PCA, CC_PCA and Cash (Panel A) and between UC_PCA, 
CC_PCA and STD_Rett-1 (Panel B) to the EDF and Campbell equations.  Stock volatility 
STD_Rett-1 is used to proxy for information uncertainty and information asymmetry following 
Zhang (2006) and Khan and Watts (2009).  Panel A reveals that the interactions of both 
unconditional and conditional conservatism with cash (UC_PCAt-1*Casht-1 and CC_PCAt-
1*Casht-1, respectively) are significantly negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk 
proxied by EDFt in Model 1, with coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.3010 (-9.46) and -0.0276 (-
5.83), and with subsequent bankruptcy risk proxied by Campbellt in Model 2, with coefficients 
(t-statistics) -0.3437 (-10.85) and -0.0115 (-2.44), respectively.  F-statistics for the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of conservatism and of its interaction with cash is 
zero are significant beyond the 99% confidence level for both unconditional and conditional 
conservatism in Models 1 and 2.  This evidence in Panel A suggests that both unconditional 
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and conditional conservatism mitigate bankruptcy risk via their cash enhancing roles. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that the interactions of conservatism with stock return volatility 
(UC_PCAt-1*STD_Rett-1 and CC_PCAt-1* STD_Rett-1) are also significantly negatively 
associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk as proxied by EDFt in Model 1, with coefficients 
(t-statistics) of -0.0453 (-3.00) and -0.0201 (-10.56), respectively.  Similarly, the interaction of 
unconditional conservatism with return volatility is also significantly negative for Campbellt in 
Model 2, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.1367 (-9.07), but the interaction of conditional 
conservatism with return volatility is statistically insignificant.  F-statistics for the null 
hypothesis that the sums of coefficients for conservatism’s interactions with return volatility 
are zero are nonetheless significant beyond the 90% confidence level for both unconditional 
and conditional conservatism in Models 1 and 2.  Overall, this evidence in Panel B suggests 
that both unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate bankruptcy risk via their 
informational roles. 
4.5 Sarbanes-Oxley, Auditor Turnover and Causal Relations between Bankruptcy Risk 
and Subsequent Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism 
This section uses the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (SOX) and auditor 
resignations as natural experiments to examine the effects of auditors, regulators and litigation 
on causal relations between bankruptcy risk and unconditional and conditional conservatism.  
Prior evidence suggests that SOX heightened legal and regulatory attention to financial 
reporting and increased managerial legal exposures and punishment, and thus increased 
accounting conservatism (Lobo and Zhou (2006), Cefaratti et al. (2010)). 17   Auditor 
resignations are often triggered by aggressive reporting or misrepresentations (Krishnan and 
Krishnan (1997), Menon and William (2008), Krishnan et al. (2010)) that heighten litigation 
risk and monitoring by successor auditors, regulators and investors.  Our main argument for 
relations between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional and conditional conservatism 
is that monitoring by auditors and regulators mainly enhances unconditional conservatism 
which is their primary focus (Qiang (2007)) and the relation is stronger as bankruptcy risk 
increases.  If this argument is valid, then the interaction of bankruptcy risk and an indicator for 
the post-SOX period (SOX), and the interaction of bankruptcy risk and an indicator for post-
                                                
17Lobo and Zhou (2006) find that both unconditional conservatism (measured by total accruals) and conditional conservatism 
(Basu (1997) measure) increased in the post-SOX period.  Similarly, Cefaratti et al. (2010) report that the passage of SOX 
enhanced litigation risk and increased conservatism.  We find that unconditional conservatism (UC_PCA) increases from 
0.3443 in the pre-SOX period (2000-2002) to 0.3805 in the post-SOX period (2003-2005), with a t-statistic of 8.77.  
Conditional conservatism (CC_PCA) increases from 0.8055 in the pre-SOX period to 0.8582 in the post-SOX period, with a t-
statistic of 1.60. 
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auditor-resignation periods (Post_resign) should increase subsequent unconditional 
conservatism.  We test this conjecture by replicating the analysis in Panel A, Table 2, adding 
these interactions. 
Results reported in Panel A of Table 6 reveal that interactions of SOX with EDFt-1 and 
Campbellt-1 are both statistically positive for UC_PCAt, suggesting that enhanced auditor and 
regulator monitoring following the passage of SOX enhanced the effects of bankruptcy risk on 
subsequent unconditional conservatism as predicted by H2a.  In contrast, interactions of SOX 
with EDFt-1 and Campbellt-1 are insignificantly associated with CC_PCAt, suggesting that SOX 
influenced little the effects of bankruptcy risk on subsequent conditional conservatism as 
predicted by H2b.  The interaction of SOX with UC_PCAt-1 is statistically significant for EDFt 
but is insignificant for Campbellt, with the opposite is true for the interaction of SOX with 
CC_PCAt-1.  These findings suggest that SOX enhanced, albeit modestly, the mitigating effects 
of both unconditional and conditional conservatism on subsequent bankruptcy risk. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
For a subsample of 124 firms with auditor resignations between 2000 and 2007,18 panel B 
of Table 6 reveals that interactions of Post_resign with EDFt-1 and Campbellt-1 are statistically 
significant for UC_PCAt but insignificant for CC_PCAt in both Models 1 and 2.  Interactions of 
Post_resign with UC_PCAt-1 and with CC_PCAt-1 are insignificant for both EDFt and 
Campbellt in both Models 1 and 2, respectively.  Untabulated results indicate that mean 
UC_PCA (CC_PCA) in the pre-resignation period is 0.3710 (1.2295), which increases 
(decreases) to 0.4200 (1.1639) in the post-resignation period, with t-statistics for these changes 
significant for UC_PCA and insignificant for CC_PCA.  Overall, Table 6 provides evidence 
suggesting that SOX and auditor resignations increase unconditional conservatism more than 
conditional conservatism as bankruptcy risk increases, contributing to a positive relation 
between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional conservatism as predicted by 
hypothesis H2a. 
4.6 Conservatism Gaming and Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy 
Risk 
“Conservatism gaming,” a version of earnings smoothing whereby managers apply more 
conservatism during good times to provide earnings cushions during downturns is a possible 
alternative explanation for observed relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk, with 
a negative relation between conservatism gaming and bankruptcy risk follows from earnings 
                                                
18 Auditor resignation data were collected from AuditAnalytics in the WRDS database, 6 in fiscal year 2000, 4 in 2001, 6 in 
2002, 18 in 2003, 33 in 2004, 22 in 2005, 23 in 2006 and 12 in 2007. 
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smoothing studies.  Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that earnings smoothing may serve as a 
hedge against bankruptcy risk; Trueman and Titman (1988) concur that earnings smoothing 
may lower claimholders’ perceptions of bankruptcy risk by lowering perceptions of earnings 
volatility.  To address whether causal relations between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism and bankruptcy risk are robust to conservatism gaming, we employ a tetra-variate 
VARX (1) model consisting of equations (11) to (14): 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + θ11Esmootht-1 + Controlst + ε11 (10) 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + θ21Esmootht-1 + Controlst + ε21  (11) 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + θ31Esmootht-1 + Controlst + ε31 (12) 
Esmootht = α40 + β41BRt-1 + γ41UC_PCAt-1 + δ41CC_PCAt-1 + θ41Esmootht-1 + Controlst + ε41   (13) 
where BR is EDF or Campbell and Controlst in equations (10) to (12) and their predictions are 
the same as for equations (3) to (5) and Controlst in equation (14) include Leveraget, ROAt, 
Ln(MV)t, Volatility_ROAt, and industry and year dummies, which are previously identified 
determinants of earnings smoothing.  We consider two types of income smoothing to proxy for 
conservatism gaming:  innate smoothing, the product of negative one times the Spearman 
correlation between accruals and OCF, and discretionary smoothing, the decile ranking of the 
product of negative one times the ratio of the standard deviation of accruals to that of OCF. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Table 7 reveals that the causal relations between the two types of conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk observed above are robust to conservatism gaming.  Qualitatively similar 
results hold for discretionary smoothing (results not tabulated).  Table 7 further reveals that 
innate smoothing, Esmootht-1, is significantly negatively associated with Campbellt, consistent 
with theoretical predictions (Smith and Stulz (1985) and Trueman and Titman (1988)) and 
prior findings that innate smoothing reveals information and increases firm value (Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006), Leuz et al. (2003)).  In contrast, discretionary smoothing has a weak 
mitigating effect on bankruptcy risk, whereas bankruptcy risk is negatively associated 
subsequent discretionary smoothing, consistent with the argument that discretionary smoothing 
reduces information transparency (untabulated results available on request). 
4.9 Robustness Checks 
Sensitivity Tests for Validity of the VARX Models 
Because VARX models are sensitive to order, we reordered predictors in each equation 
with qualitatively similar findings.  First-differenced specifications for the VARX models yield 
weaker but qualitatively similar findings, with autoregressive coefficients for the two 
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conservatism measures significantly negative, consistent with the inference from our Dickey-
Fuller unit-root tests that taking first-differences may yield biased results in the VARX models 
with no unit-root.  Concerns that mean-reversions of accruals or EDFt and Campbellt could 
explain our findings is made unlikely by our design that utilizes three-year averages for 
UC_ACC and CC_ACM to control for mean-reversions and conservatism metrics that are 
relatively insensitive to accrual reversals (UC_BM, UNC_RES, CC_AR and CC_CR).  In all 
EDFt and Campbellt regressions, the coefficients on EDFt-1 and on Campbellt-1 are significantly 
positive, indicating no mean-reverting tendencies in the bankruptcy risk measures. 
Alternative Tests for Cash Enhancing and Informational Roles of Conservatism 
To address the possibility that firms with weak (strong) cash flows prefer aggressive 
(conservative) reporting with cash holdings thus causing higher conservatism and lower 
bankruptcy risk, we orthogonalize both UC_PCA and CC_PCA by the lagged value of cash, 
and use the residual value of UC_PCA and CC_PCA to replace their original values in the 
VARX (1) models in Panel A, Table 5.  This treatment does not qualitatively change our 
results.  Using the upside potentials of cash holdings to proxy for cash following BMS (2011), 
the results in Panel A, Table 5 do not qualitatively change.  For Panel B, Table 5, we 
alternatively use earnings forecast errors and earnings forecast dispersions (Zhang (2006)), and 
the information asymmetry component of PIN score adjPIN (Duarte and Young (2009)) to 
measure information uncertainty and asymmetry, and these yield qualitatively similar findings. 
Controls for Debt Contracting, Debtholders’ and Shareholders’ Interests 
Whereas results in Panel B of Table 3 suggest that relations between conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk hold for bankrupt firms, there remains the question of whether the observed 
relations are robust to controls for debt contracting, debtholders’ and shareholders’ interests.  
To address this question, we replicate the tests in Panel A of Table 3 introducing additional 
controls for private debtholder monitoring, leverage, auditor going-concern opinions and credit 
ratings.  Private debtholder monitoring is measured as the ratio of the sum of private long-term 
debt, other long-term debt and capitalized lease obligations to total long-term debt, following 
Qiang (2007).  Leverage is an indicator of higher debt costs, larger debtholder claims, more 
intense monitoring and accentuated conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders.  
A dummy for periods following auditors’ going-concern opinions proxies for enhanced 
debtholders control relative to shareholders.  Untabulated results reveal that these additional 
controls do not qualitatively change our findings (available on request). 
Debt ratings proxy for both cost of debt and monitoring by rating agencies.  We code 
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S&P long-term debt–ratings on a scale of 1 to 21, with 1 for a “AAA” rating and “21” for “D” 
rating. Untabulated results show that results previously reported remain qualitatively 
unchanged after controlling for credit ratings.  Surprisingly, credit ratings are significantly 
negatively associated with EDFt and Campbellt.  They are positively associated with UC_PCAt 
and CC_PCAt, consistent with both the monitoring role of credit ratings, and with credit ratings 
inadequately capturing default risk, as illustrated by the bankruptcies of highly-rated firms 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Controls for Earnings Management 
To examine whether our results are robust to earnings management, we rerun the tetra-
variate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (10) to (13) by replacing Esmooth with 
Emgmt,.  Untabulated results show that the conclusions about the causal relations between 
bankruptcy risk and unconditional and conditional conservatism still hold.  Importantly, both 
UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 are negatively associated with subsequent Emgmtt, corroborating 
Watts’ (2003) and Kothari et al.’s (2010) reasoning that, absent conservatism, financial 
reporting would be biased upward a priori in practice (results are available on request). 
Alternative Measures of Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy 
Risk 
To address the possibility that UC_ACC and UC_RES insufficiently reflect discretionary 
unconditional conservatism, we alternatively use Qiang’s (2007) accrual-based measure to 
replace UC_ACC, and the first difference of UC_RES to replace UC_RES.  The results are 
qualitatively similar to previous findings.  To address the possibility that the industry-adjusted 
BM ratio UC_BM captures both unconditional and conditional conservatism, we use the 
industry-specific component of the BM ratio to proxy for unconditional conservatism 
following Qiang (2007) and Beaver and Ryan (2000) to find that results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  We do not use this measure in our main tests because it is invariant over time and 
thus inapplicable to VARX time-series modeling. 
To address the possibility that CC_AR is subject to a potential mechanical relationship 
with EDF and Campbell since all are functions of leverage, return volatility, size and book-to-
market ratios, we use the negative skewness measure in Zhang (2008) to replace CC_AR.  
Results for the tests in Panel A of Table 2 are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that this 
potential mechanical relationship is not a serious concern.  Using an A_score defined as the 
ratio of the C score to the sum of C score and G score from Khan and Watts (2009) and 
CC_CR calculated using the direct method following Callen et al. (2009) to measure 
conditional conservatism also do not qualitatively change our findings.  Using averages and 
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rankings of UC_ACC, UC_BM and UNCON_RES to measure unconditional conservatism, and 
of CC_ACM, CC_AR and CC_CR to measure conditional conservatism yield qualitatively 
similar results.  When Altman’s (1968) Z-score is used as an alternate bankruptcy risk metric, 
main results in Tables 2 and 3 are qualitatively unchanged.  Following Campbell et al. (2009) 
we winsorise stock prices below $15 to avoid estimation bias caused by small-cap stocks; 
when we relax this limitation, our results do not qualitatively change (all results available on 
request). 
5.  Conclusion 
This study examines relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk that 
follow from conservatism’s cash enhancing and informational properties.  Our primary 
findings are negative associations between both unconditional and conditional conservatism 
and subsequent bankruptcy risk consistent with conservatism’s cash enhancing and 
informational roles, a positive (negative) association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent 
unconditional conservatism consistent with the interests of auditors, investors and regulators to 
mitigate future failure risk, and a negative association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent 
and concurrent conditional conservatism, consistent with countervailing managerial incentives 
to withhold bad news for career motives.  Further analyses provide confirming evidence that 
both the cash enhancing and informational roles of conservatism help mitigate bankruptcy, and 
that regulators’ and auditors’ monitoring enhances the demand for unconditional conservatism 
as bankruptcy risk increases, with similar effects for SOX regulations and auditor resignations.  
The findings are qualitatively unchanged under conditions of extreme distress and actual 
bankruptcy, and are robust to endogeneity between unconditional and conditional conservatism, 
debt contracting considerations, conservatism gaming and other controls. 
These findings have several key implications.  First, they provide evidence consistent 
with a traditional rationale for accounting conservatism that it arose from the requests of capital 
providers, joined in recent times by auditors and regulators, to help conserve cash and enhance 
transparency, and thereby reduce failure risk.  Second, our evidence that accounting 
conservatism mitigates bankruptcy risk is consistent with the findings that conservatism 
reduces cost of capital and increases trading contracting efficiency (Zhang (2008), Hui et al. 
(2009b)) but makes contributions by showing that the evidence follows from the cash 
enhancing and informational roles of conservatism.  Third, this evidence is not only central to 
the interests of firms’ stakeholders but also to economic policy makers by helping to dampen 
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the contagion effects of bankruptcy. 19   Fourth, findings that bankruptcy risk is related 
differently with subsequent unconditional and conditional conservatism are consistent with 
offsetting managerial, auditors’ and regulators’ interests.  Lastly, our evidence helps inform 
ongoing debates regarding the role of conservatism as an enduring core concept of financial 
accounting. 
As this is the first study to empirically examine relations between accounting 
conservatism and bankruptcy risk, there is considerable potential for related research.  For 
example, this study leaves largely unexplored specific linkages between conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk that explain precisely how its cash enhancing and informational properties 
relate to bankruptcy risk, how bankruptcy risk influences decisions regarding unconditional 
and conditional conservatism, how these relations are affected by differing economic 
conditions, how they relate to economic policies, and whether they hold in other countries with 
different institutional arrangements, for example, in developing economies and settings with 
differing bankruptcy provisions or regulations. 
                                                
19 Thus, this study complements evidence in Francis et al. (2010) that conservatism benefited shareholders during the 2008-
2009 financial crisis and in Kim and Zhang (2010) that conservatism helps mitigate stock market crash risk, suggesting that 
conservatism is relevant to economic policy-making. 
 29 
 
References 
 
Ahmed, A. S., Billings, B. K., Morton, R. M. and Stanford-Harris, M., 2002.  The Role of 
Accounting Conservatism in Mitigating Bondholder-Shareholder Conflicts over Dividend 
Policy and in Reducing Debt Costs.  The Accounting Review 77, 867–890. 
Ahmed, A. S. and Duellman, S., 2007.  Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director 
Characteristics:  An Empirical Analysis.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 411-437. 
Altman, E., 1968.  Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy.  Journal of Finance 23, 589–609. 
Anderson, R. and Sundaresan, S., 1996.  Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts.  Review of 
Financial Studies 9, 37–68. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P. and Nikolaev, V., 2009.  Econometrics of the Basu Asymmetric 
Timeliness Coefficient and the Accounting Conservatism.  Working paper, University of 
Chicago. 
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R. and Lang, M. H., 2008.  International Accounting Standards 
and Accounting Quality.  Journal of Accounting Research 46, 467-498. 
Basu, S., 1997.  The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.  
Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3-37. 
Basu, S., 2009.  Conservatism Research:  Historical Development and Future Prospects.  
Chinese Journal of Accounting Research 2, 1-20. 
Beaver, W. H. and Ryan, S. G., 2000.  Biases and Lags in Book Value and Their Effects on the 
Ability of the Book-To-Market Ratio to Predict Book Return on Equity.  Journal of Accounting 
Research 38, 127–148. 
Beaver, W. H. and Ryan, S. G., 2005.  Unconditional and conditional Conservatism:  Concepts 
and Modeling.  Review of Accounting Studies 10, 269-309. 
Biddle, G. C., 1980.  Accounting Methods and Management Decisions:  The Case of Inventory 
Costing and Inventory Policy.  Journal of Accounting Research 18, 235-280. 
Biddle, G. C., Ma, M. and Song, M., 2011.  The Risk Management Role of Accounting 
Conservatism.  Working paper, University of Hong Kong. 
Black, F. and Scholes, M., 1973.  The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.  Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 637–654. 
Bublitz, B. and Ettredge, M., 1989.  The Information in Discretionary Outlays:  Advertising, 
Research and Development.  The Accounting Review 64, 108-124. 
Bushman, R., M., Piotroski, J. D. and Smith, A., 2010.  Capital Allocation and Timely 
Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses.  Working Paper, The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Callen, J. L., Segal D. and Hope, O-K., 2010a.  The Pricing of Conservative Accounting and 
the Measurement of Conservatism at the Firm-Year Level.  Review of Accounting Studies 15, 
145-178. 
Callen, J. L., Chen, F., Dou, Y. and Xin, B., 2010b.  Information Asymmetry and the Debt 
Contracting Demand for Accounting Conservatism.  Working paper, University of Toronto. 
 30 
Campbell, J., Hilscher, J. and Szilagyi, J., 2008.  In Search of Distress Risk.  Journal of 
Finance 53, 2899-2939. 
Carapeto, M., 2005.  Bankruptcy Bargaining with Outside Options and Strategic Delay.  
Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 736–746. 
Cefaratti, M., Dorminey, J., Lin, H., and Reed, T., 2010.  The Effect of Litigation Risk on 
Conservatism: A Comparative Study of PSLRA and SOX.  Working paper, Northern Illinois 
University. 
Chen, N., 2003.  Three Essays on Information Asymmetry and Corporate Defaults.  Columbia 
University. 
De Ste. Croix, G. E. M., 1956.  Greek and Roman Accounting, pp. 14-74.  In:  Littleton, A. C. 
and Yamey, B. S., ed., Studies in the History of Accounting, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, IL. 
Doan, T., 1992.  Rats User's Manual, Version 4.0, Estima. 
Duarte, J. and Young, L. 2009.  Why is PIN priced?  Journal of Financial Economics 91, 119-
138. 
Eberhart, A., Maxwell, W. and Siddique, A., 2008.  A Reexamination of the Tradeoff between 
the Future Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases.  Journal of Accounting Research 46, 27-
52. 
Fama E. F. and French, K. R., 1997.  Industry Costs of Equity.  Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153-192. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1980.  Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 
2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2008.  Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: 
The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and Constraints of 
Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information.  Exposure Draft.  Financial Accounting 
Series No. 1570-100. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2010.  Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 
8. Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting.  
Francis, B., Hasan, I. and Wu, Q., 2010.  The Benefits of Accounting Conservatism to 
Shareholders:  Evidence from the Financial Crisis.  Working paper, Rochester Institute of 
Technology. 
Francis, J. and Martin, X., 2010.  Acquisition Profitability and Timely Loss Recognition.  
Journal of Accounting and Economics 49, 161-178. 
Giammarino, Ronald M., 1989.  The Resolution of Financial Distress.  Review of Financial 
Studies, 2, 25–47. 
Givoly, D. and Hayn, C., 2000.  The Changing Time-Series Properties Of Earnings, Cash 
Flows and Accruals: Has Financial Reporting Become More Conservative?  Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 29, 287–320. 
Givoly, D., Hayn, C. and Natarajan, A., 2007.  Measuring Reporting Conservatism.  The 
Accounting Review 82, 65-106. 
Gox, R. and Wagenhofer, R., 2009.  Optimal Impairment Rules.  Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 48, 2–16. 
Granger, C. W. J., 1969.  Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-
spectral Methods.  Econometrica 37 , 424–438. 
 31 
Guay, W. and Verrecchia, R. E., 2007.  Conservative Disclosure.  Working paper, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
Hagerman, R. and Zmijewski, M. E., 1979.  Some Economic Determinants of Accounting 
Policy Choice.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 1, 141-61. 
Hertzel, M. G., Officer, M. S., Li, Z. and Rodgers, K. J., 2008.  Inter-Firm Linkages and the 
Wealth Effects of Financial Distress Along the Supply Chain.  Journal of Financial Economics 
87, 374-387. 
Hillegeist, Keating, E. K., Cram, D. P. and Lundstedt, K. G., 2004.  Assessing the Probability 
of Bankruptcy.  Review of Accounting Studies 9, 5-34. 
Hui, K. W., Morse, D. and Matsunaga, S., 2009a.  The Impact of Conservatism on 
Management Quantitative Earnings Forecasts.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 47, 192-
207. 
Hui, K. W, Klasa, S. and Yeung, E., 2009b.  Corporate Suppliers and Customers and 
Accounting Conservatism.  Working paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. 
Jones, S., 2011.  Does the Capitalization of Intangible Assets Increase the Predictability of 
Corporate Failure? 
Jorion, P. and Zhang, G., 2009.  Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk.  Journal of Finance 
64, 2053-2087. 
Khan, M. and Watts, R., 2009.  Estimation and Empirical Properties of a Firm-Year Measure 
of Conservatism.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 48, 132-150. 
Kim, J., Ramaswamy, K. and Sundaresan, S., 1993.  Does Default Risk in Coupons Affect the 
Valuation of Corporate Bonds:  A Contingent Claims Model.  Financial Management, 117–
131. 
Kim, J. and Zhang, L., 2010.  Does Accounting Conservatism Reduce Stock Price Crash Risk? 
Firm-Level Evidence.  Working paper, City University of Hong Kong. 
Kirschenheiter, M. and Ramakrishnan, R., 2010.  Prudence Demands Conservatism.  Working 
paper, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S. and Wysocki, P., 2009.  Do Managers Withhold Bad News?  Journal of 
Accounting Research 47, 241-276. 
Kothari, S. P., Ramanna, K. and Skinner, D. J., 2010.  Implications for GAAP from an 
Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 246-
248. 
Krishnan, J., and Krishnan, J., 1997.  Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations.  The 
Accounting Review 72 539-60. 
Krishnan, G., Sun, L. and Wang, Q., 2010.  Accruals Quality, Audit Fees, and Auditor 
Resignations.  Working paper, Lehigh University. 
LaFond, R. and Watts, R., 2008.  The Information Role of Conservatism.  The Accounting 
Review 83, 447–478. 
Lang, L. and Stulz, R., 1992.  Contagion and Competitive Intra-industry Effects of Bankruptcy 
Announcements.  Journal of Financial Economics 32, 45–60. 
Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B. G. and Penalva, F., 2009.  Accounting Conservatism and Corporate 
Governance.  Review of Accounting Studies 14, 161-201. 
 32 
Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B. G. and Penalva, F., 2010a.  Conditional Conservatism and Cost of 
Capital.  Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming. 
Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B, G. and Penalva, F., 2010b.  Conditional Conservatism and Firm 
Investment Efficiency.  Working paper, Universidad Carlos III De Madrid. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, P., 2003.  Earnings Management and Investor Protection: 
An International Comparison.  Journal of Financial Economics 69, 505-527. 
Lev, B., Sarath, B. and Sougiannis, T., 2005.  R&D Reporting Biases and Their Consequences.  
Contemporary Accounting Research 22, 977-1026. 
Li, J., 2008.  Accounting Conservatism, Information Uncertainty and Analysts’ Forecasts.  
Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University. 
Li, X., 2010.  Accounting Conservatism and the Cost of Capital:  International Analysis.  
Working paper, London Business School. 
Lobo, G. J. and Zhou, J., 2006.  Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act?  Initial Evidence.  Accounting Horizons 20, 57-73. 
Loktionov, Y., 2009.  Does Accounting Quality Mitigate Risk Shifting?  Working paper, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Louis, H., Sun, A. and Urcan, O., 2009.  Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting 
Conservatism.  Working paper, Pennsylvania State University. 
Menon, K. and Williams, D., 2008.  Management Turnover Following Auditor Resignations.  
Contemporary Accounting Research 25, 567–604. 
Merton, R. C., 1974.  On The Pricing of Corporate Debt:  The Risk Structure of Interest Rates.  
Journal of Finance 29, 449–470. 
Mooradian, R. M., 1994.  The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment:  Chapter 11 as a 
Screening Device.  Journal of Finance, 49, 1403–1430. 
Ohlson, J. A., 1980.  Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy.  Journal 
of Accounting Research 18, 109-131. 
Parker S., Peters G. and Turetsky, H., 2002.  Corporate Governance and Corporate Failure:  A 
Survival Analysis.  Corporate Governance 2, 4-12. 
Penman, S. H. and Zhang, X., 2002.  Accounting Conservatism, the Quality of Earnings, and 
Stock Returns.  The Accounting Review 77, 237-264. 
Qiang, X., 2007.  The Effects of Contracting, Litigation, Regulation, and Tax Costs on 
Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism: Cross-Sectional Evidence at the Firm Level.  
The Accounting Review 82, 759-796. 
Qiang, X., 2008.  The Information Role of Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism. 
Working paper, Xiamen University. 
Roychowdhury, S. and Watts, R. L., 2007.  Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Market-To-
Book and Conservatism in Financial Reporting.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 44, 2-
31. 
Ryan, S. G., 2006.  Identifying Conditional Conservatism.  European Accounting Review 15, 
511 -525. 
Shumway, T., 2001.  Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately:  A Simple Hazard Model.  
Journal of Business 74, 101-124. 
 33 
Sims, C. A., 1980.  Macroeconomics and Reality.  Econometrica 48, 1-49. 
Smith, C. W. and Stulz, R. M., 1985.  The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies.  Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 391-405. 
Srivastava, A. and Tse, S., 2010.  The Contribution of Delayed Gain Recognition to Trends in 
Conservatism: A Re-Examination Using a New Approach to Measuring Accounting 
Conservatism.  Working paper, Northwestern University. 
Trueman, B. and Titman, S., 1988.  An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing.  
Journal of Accounting Research 26, 127-139. 
Tucker J. W. and Zarowin, P. A., 2006.  Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings 
Informativeness?  The Accounting Review 81, 251-270. 
Uhrig-Homburg, M., 2005.  Cash-flow Shortage as an Endogenous Bankruptcy Reason.  
Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 1509–1534. 
Vassalou, M. and Xing, H., 2004.  Default Risk in Equity Returns.  Journal of Finance 59, 
831–868. 
Vuolteenaho, T., 2002.  What Drives Firm-Level Stock Returns?  Journal of Finance 57, 233–
264. 
Watts, R., 2003.  Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications.  
Accounting Horizons 17, 207–221. 
Wittenberg-Moerman, R., 2008.  The Role of Information Asymmetry and Financial Reporting 
Quality in Debt Trading:  Evidence from the Secondary Loan Market.  Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 46, 240-260. 
Zmijewski, M. E., 1984.  Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress 
Prediction Models.  Journal of Accounting Research 22, 59-82. 
Zhang, F., 2006.  Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns.  Journal of Finance 61, 105-137. 
Zhang, J., 2008.  The Contracting Benefits of Accounting Conservatism to Lenders and 
Borrowers.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 27–54. 
 34 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Test Variables 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample of firm-year observations from 1989 through 2007.  Panel A 
presents the summary statistics and Panel B presents pairwise correlations among bankruptcy risk and accounting 
conservatism measures.  The upper (lower) triangle of Panel B displays Pearson product-moment (Spearman) correlations 
with highlighted figures indicating statistical significance at the 90% confidence level.  Variable definitions are provided 
below. 
 
Panel A:  Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 
EDF (unranked, %) 3.6502 0.0000 0.0000 0.0558 
Campbell (unranked, %) 0.0127 0.0014 0.0028 0.0064 
BANK  0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
UC_PCA 0.3659 0.1897 0.3639 0.5319 
UC_ACC -0.0012 -0.0218 0.0010 0.0209 
UC_BM (unranked) -1.9489 -2.2175 -1.3437 -0.8280 
UC_RES 0.0729 0.0000 0.0190 0.0910 
CC_PCA 0.9188 0.4394 0.9534 1.5941 
CC_ACM 0.0189 0.0004 0.0156 0.0355 
CC_AR 2.1255 1.2598 1.9177 2.8431 
CC_CR -0.3102 -0.4259 -0.1237 0.1165 
Leverage 5.8566 4.3320 5.8492 7.3159 
ln(MV) 0.2540 0.1290 0.2478 0.3622 
ROA 0.0336 0.0141 0.0420 0.0728 
STD_Ret  0.4833 0.2939 0.4226 0.6119 
Cash 0.0868 0.0131 0.0417 0.1156 
ΔCash 0.0061 -0.0103 0.0015 0.0217 
Rate 0.0418 0.0287 0.0460 0.0516 
Inten_RD 0.1261 0.0054 0.0219 0.0612 
Monitor 0.8448 1.0000 0.8924 1.0000 
Rating 9.0508 9.0000 70000 12.0000 
Esmooth (unranked) 0.6048 0.4000 0.7000 0.9000 
Emgmt -0.2631 -0.4550 -0.2735 -0.0771 
Volatility_ROA 0.0054 0.0002 0.0006 0.0023 
Turn 1.1700 0.6405 1.0352 1.4803 
Eissue 0.0530 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 
Dissue 0.2137 -0.0457 0.0566 0.2225 
Growth 0.2649 0.0051 0.0858 0.1955 
Nimtaavg 0.0305 0.0101 0.0311 0.0476 
Exretavg -0.0031 -0.0244 0.0002 0.0226 
Rsize -10.0948 -11.5031 -10.0096 -8.6159 
Mb 0.9042 0.4510 0.7442 1.2077 
Price 2.3341 2.1401 2.7081 2.7081 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Test Variables (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B:  Correlation Matrix for the Full Sample 
 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1.  EDF 1 0.7789 0.0265 -0.1948 -0.0333 -0.2300 -0.0138 0.2404 -0.0023 0.4880 0.0671 
2.  Campbell 0.7789 1 0.0348 -0.0590 0.0334 -0.2136 -0.0025 0.2468 -0.0081 0.4764 0.0788 
3.  BANK 0.0265 0.0348 1 -0.0287 -0.0222 -0.0256 -0.0096 0.0117 -0.0103 0.0407 -0.0035 
4.  UC_PCA -0.2168 -0.2170 -0.0298 1 0.1820 0.9025 0.4861 -0.0637 0.1237 -0.2020 0.0104 
5.  UC_ACC -0.0274 0.0397 -0.0158 0.1611 1 0.0517 0.0489 0.0029 0.4819 -0.0728 0.0284 
6.  UC_BM -0.2303 -0.2139 -0.0256 0.9349 0.0574 1 0.0808 -0.0964 0.0516 -0.2485 -0.0061 
7.  UC_RES -0.0474 -0.1398 -0.0078 0.3023 -0.0390 0.0411 1 0.0468 0.0551 0.0514 0.0301 
8.  CC_PCA 0.4111 0.4095 0.0317 -0.1441 -0.0243 -0.1704 -0.0028 1 -0.0062 0.7160 0.6850 
9.  CC_ACM -0.0204 -0.0454 -0.0089 0.1057 0.4483 0.0485 0.0391 0.0262 1 -0.0425 0.0375 
10.  CC_AR 0.4655 0.4335 0.0407 -0.2084 -0.0901 -0.2359 -0.0060 0.4056 -0.0591 1 0.0426 
11.  CC_CR 0.1922 0.2145 0.0080 -0.0299 0.0336 -0.0426 -0.0043 0.9305 0.0245 0.1167 1 
EDF is the ranking of the expected one-year-ahead default probability from Merton (1974) model.  Campbell is the 
ranking of the one-month-ahead probability of business failure calculated based on the formula in the last column of 
Table III in Campbell et al. (2008).  BANK proxies for bankruptcy risk and is equal to one if the firm files for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy code, and zero otherwise.  UC_PCA is the factor 
score generated from a principal component analysis of the three unconditional conservatism measurements: 
UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES.  Their eigenvalues are 0.9539, 1.1433 and 0.9028; their eigenvectors are 0.5380, 
0.6342 and 0.6721; and their final communality estimates are 0.2894, 0.4022 and 0.4517, respectively.  UC_ACC is 
equal to minus one times the ratio of total accruals to average total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the 
current year and prior two years.  UC_BM is the industry-adjusted ranking of minus one times the ratio of book to 
market value of common shareholders' equity at fiscal year-end.  UC_RES is the ratio of LIFO reserves plus hidden 
R&D and advertising reserves resulting from the application of unconditional conservatism to total assets, estimated 
as follows:  UC_RESit = (INVitres + RDitres + ADVitres) / ATit.  CC_PCA is the factor score generated from a principal 
component analysis of the three conditional conservatism measurements:  CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR.  Their 
eigenvalues are 1.0461, 1.0324, and 0.9214; their eigenvectors are 0.3176, 0.5468, 0.8040; and their final 
communality estimates are 0.1008, 0.2990, and 0.6464, respectively.  CC_ACM is minus one times the ratio of 
accumulated non-operating accruals to accumulated total assets, calculated over a rolling window of current year 
and prior two years.  CC_AR is the ratio of C score plus G score to G score as defined in Khan and Watts (2009), 
using the formula in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) to calculate the CC_AR.  CC_CR is the ratio of unexpected 
current earnings (or current earnings shocks) to total earnings news with the ratio times minus one if earnings news 
is positive.  Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year.  Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of book value of long-term debt (Compustat DLTT) and short-term debt (Compustat DLC) to 
total assets (Compustat AT).  ROA is the ratio of earnings (Compustat NI) over total assets (Compustat AT).  
STD_Ret is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock return over the prior twelve months.  Cash is the ratio 
of cash holdings (Compustat CHE) to total assets (Compustat AT).  ΔCash is the ratio of cash flow (Compustat 
CHECH) to total assets (Compustat AT).  Rate is the risk-free rate measured by the annualized three-month T-bill 
rate retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank Reports.  Inten_RD is the ratio of R&D expenses (Compustat XRD) to 
total assets (Compustat AT).  SOX is an indicator for the period after the passage of the SOX Act, equal to 1 for 
fiscal years 2003 and after, and 0 otherwise.  Aud_Resign is an indicator for an auditor’s resignation from a client 
firm equal to 1 for the three-year period after auditor resignation and 0 otherwise.  Emgmt is the factor score 
generated from a principal component analysis of four earnings management metrics:  the ranking of absolute value 
of discretionary accrual DA, abnormal operational cash flow R_OCF, abnormal discretionary expenses R_DISX, 
and abnormal product cost R_PROD.  Their eigenvalues are 1.2992, 1.1747, 0.8823 and 0.6438; their eigenvectors 
are 0.2138, -0.7195, 0.8136 and -0.2691; and their final communality estimates are 0.0473, 0.5177, 0.6619 and 
0.0724, respectively.  Esmooth proxies for conservatism gaming and is measured as negative one times the 
Spearman correlation of OCF and accruals with both deflated by average total assets, measured using a rolling 
window of five fiscal years for all available accrual and cash flow data.  Volatility_ROA proxies for earnings 
variability estimated as the variance of ROA calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior four 
years.  SPOS is an indicator for small positive earnings that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is 
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between 0 and 0.01, following Barth et al. (2008).  Turn is measured as sales (Compustat SALE) divided by end-of-
year total assets (Compustat AT), following Barth et al. (2008).  Eissue is annual percentage change in shares of 
common stock measured as the ratio of the change in shares outstanding at the current and previous fiscal year-ends 
to the common shares outstanding at previous fiscal year-end (Compustat CSHO).  Dissue is annual change in total 
liabilities (Compustat LT) deflated by beginning-of-year total liabilities, following Barth et al. (2008).  Growth is 
annual change in sales (Compustat SALE) deflated by sales in previous period.  Nimtaavg proxies for earnings 
predictability defined as the present value of the three-year sum of NIMTA, the annual net income deflated by total 
liabilities and market value, assuming earnings degenerate at the monthly rate φ = ½: Nimtaavgt-1,t-4 
= .  Exretavg proxies for return predictability of EXRET (past 
excess return relative to the value weighted S&P 500 index return over a period of 12 months), and Exretavgt-1,t-12 
= , where EXRETit = log(1+Rit) - log(1 + RS&P500,t), and φ = ½.  Rsize proxies 
for relative firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of market value of equity relative to that of the S&P 500 
index.  Mb is the ratio of firm’s market equity value to its book equity value at fiscal year-end.  Price is calculated 
as the log of price per share winsorised above $15, following Campbell et al. (2008). 
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Table 2  Causal Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
Bankruptcy Risk Estimated by VARX (1) Models 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for tri-variate VARX (1) models.  Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and 
Campbell; unconditional and conditional conservatism measures are UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively.  Model 1 uses 
EDF, UC_PCA, and CC_PCA as dependent variables and their one-period lags as autoregressive vectors; Model 2 uses 
Campbell, UC_PCA, and CC_PCA as dependent variables and their one-period lags as autoregressive vectors.  Panel A 
reports the results for the full sample; Panel B reports the results for the extremely distressed subsample of firm-year 
observations in the highest decile of (-ROA).  Model details are provided below. 
 
Panel A:  Tri-variate VARX (1) Model Results for the Full Sample 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent 
Variables EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.3532 0.0191 2.9846 0.3842 0.0213 3.0627 
 (17.21)*** (3.73)*** (46.56)*** (18.10)*** (4.23)*** (48.60)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0431 0.6616 0.0940 -0.0184 0.6619 0.0571 
 (-8.82)*** (186.62)*** (2.12)*** (-3.65)*** (186.70)*** (1.29) 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0083 0.0021 -0.0128 -0.0111 0.0019 -0.0076 
 (-15.05)*** (5.17)*** (-2.56)*** (-19.38)*** (4.67)*** (-1.52) 
EDFt-1 0.2459 0.0389 -0.2865    
 (62.20)*** (13.61)*** (-8.01)***    
Campbellt-1    0.3340 0.0388 -0.4431 
    (85.31)*** (14.16)*** (-12.95)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0377 0.0162 -0.2663 -0.0305 0.0156 -0.2673 
 (-64.60)*** (39.85)*** (-52.33)*** (-51.88)*** (39.76)*** (-54.53)*** 
Leveraget 0.6452 -0.0636 0.3180 0.4687 -0.0634 0.4000 
 (95.17)*** (-13.39)*** (5.35)*** (67.79)*** (-13.40)*** (6.77)*** 
ROAt -0.4263 -0.2552 -6.5643 -0.9634 -0.2437 -6.7519 
 (-33.93)*** (-28.33)*** (-58.21)*** (-73.09)*** (-26.70)*** (-59.17)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3201   0.1702   
 (77.46)***   (40.06)***   
Casht -0.0395   -0.3210   
 (-4.35)***   (-33.95)***   
ΔCasht -0.0600   -0.1348   
 (-4.39)***   (-9.52)***   
Ratet -1.1966   -0.0947   
 (-5.05)***   (-0.39)   
Inten_RDt -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0085 -0.0011 0.0024 -0.0090 
 (-0.97) (6.11)*** (-1.78)* (-2.05)** (6.23)*** (-1.89)* 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 157.52*** 185.30*** 64.13*** 197.75*** 200.64*** 167.79*** 
Sample size 34,896 34,890 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6109 0.5994 
Panel B:  Tri-variate VARX (1) Model Results for the Extremely Distressed Subsample 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent 
Variables EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.2011 0.0919 3.0555 0.2267 0.0932 3.1876 
 (3.49)*** (5.27)*** (12.16)*** (3.65)*** (5.40)*** (12.83)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0356 0.5715 0.1176 -0.0090 0.5709 0.0864 
 (-2.36)** (51.83)*** (0.74) (-0.56) (51.92)*** (0.55) 
CC_ PCAt-1 -0.0086 0.0019 0.0099 -0.0096 0.0019 0.0158 
 (-5.33)*** (1.65) (0.58) (-5.53)*** (1.57) (0.93) 
EDFt-1 0.2189 0.0299 -0.1227    
 (19.14)*** (3.59)*** (-1.02)    
Campbellt-1    0.2409 0.0299 -0.3508 
    (20.77)*** (3.79)*** (-3.09)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0400 0.0136 -0.2302 -0.0305 0.0133 -0.2420 
 (-23.96)*** (11.31)*** (-13.31)*** (-17.48)*** (11.46)*** (-14.43)*** 
Leveraget 0.8631 0.0031 -1.1485 0.4519 0.0059 -1.0447 
 (33.78)*** (0.17) (-4.36)*** (16.81)*** (0.33) (-4.03)*** 
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ROAt -0.1574 -0.0774 -6.5650 -0.2767 -0.0744 -6.4869 
 (-1.59) (-1.08) (-6.33)*** (-2.62)*** (-1.04) (-6.27)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3210   0.1909   
 (28.06)***   (15.48)***   
Casht -0.0016   -0.1584   
 (-0.07)   (-6.36)***   
ΔCasht -0.0149   -0.0582   
 (-0.44)   (-1.58)   
Ratet -1.0742   -0.4350   
 (-1.66)*   (-0.62)   
Inten_RDt 0.4858 0.3453 0.1069 0.4634 0.3449 0.2349 
 (6.38)*** (6.31)*** (0.14) (5.68)*** (6.31)*** (0.30) 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 17.55*** 12.92*** 1.05 15.61*** 14.34*** 9.53*** 
Sample size 3,488 3,488 
Sys. weighted R2 0.5893 0.5125 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The tri-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following three equations: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + α11Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13STD_Rett + α14Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet (3) 
+ α16Inten_RDt + α17 Casht + α18ΔCasht + ∑α1jInd_Dum1j + ∑α1k Year_Dum1k + ε11 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + α22Leveraget + α23ROAt + α24Ln(MV)t + α25Inten_RDt (4) 
+ ∑α2jInd_Dum2j + ∑α2kYear_Dum2k + ε21 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + α32Leveraget + α33ROAt + α34Ln(MV)t + α35Inten_RDt (5) 
+ ∑α3jInd_Dum3j + ∑α3kYear_Dum3k + ε31 
where BR = EDF in Model 1 and BR = Campbell in Model 2. 
F-statistics reported in columns 2 and 5 are for H0:  γ11 = 0 and δ11 = 0; F-statistics reported in columns 3 and 6 are for H0:  δ21 = 0, and F-
statistics reported in columns 4 and 7 are for H0:  γ31 = 0.  
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Table 3  Causal Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
Bankruptcy Risk for Full Samples Estimated by VARX (3) Models 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for tri-variate VARX (3) models.  Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and 
Campbell; unconditional and conditional conservatism measures are UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively.  Model 1 uses 
EDF, UC_PCA, and CC_PCA as dependent variables and their one-, two-, three-period lags as autoregressive vectors; 
Model 2 uses Campbell, UC_PCA, and CC_PCA as dependent variables and their one-, two-, three-period lags as 
autoregressive vectors.  Model details are provided below. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables 
EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.3315 -0.0342 2.6631 0.3469 -0.0311 2.7372 
 (18.38)*** (-8.58)*** (30.94)*** (19.60)*** (-8.00)*** (32.71)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0495 0.7670 -0.1699 -0.1637 0.7675 -0.3523 
 (-3.59)*** (125.13)*** (-1.28) (-11.90)*** (124.65)*** (-2.66)*** 
UC_PCAt-2 -0.0013 0.1147 0.3115 0.1298 0.1155 0.4209 
 (-0.09) (18.82)*** (2.37)** (9.50)*** (18.90)*** (3.20)*** 
UC_PCAt-3 -0.0034 0.0312 0.0404 0.0068 0.0302 0.0770 
 (-0.56) (11.62)*** (0.70) (1.13) (11.22)*** (1.33) 
CC_ PCAt-1 -0.0064 0.0014 -0.0105 -0.0082 0.0012 -0.0021 
 (-10.29)*** (5.06)*** (-1.77)* (-13.18)*** (4.19)*** (-0.36) 
CC_ PCAt-2 -0.0069 0.0018 0.0245 -0.0090 0.0018 0.0207 
 (-11.14)*** (6.39)*** (4.12)*** (-14.53)*** (6.65)*** (3.47)*** 
CC_ PCAt-3 -0.0030 0.0007 0.0254 -0.0035 0.0008 0.0231 
 (-5.05)*** (2.53)*** (4.51)*** (-6.07)*** (3.16)*** (4.12)*** 
EDFt-1 0.2790 0.0316 -0.5551    
 (48.07)*** (12.32)*** (-10.05)**    
EDFt-2 0.1091 0.0086 0.2038    
 (18.98)*** (3.38)*** (3.71)***    
EDFt-3 0.0348 0.0034 0.0841    
 (7.75)*** (1.73)* (1.95)*    
Campbellt-1    0.3548 0.0385 -0.9421 
    (60.65)*** (14.81)*** (-16.84)*** 
Campbellt-2    0.1348 0.0021 0.4367 
    (22.89)*** (0.82) (7.71)*** 
Campbellt-3    0.0308 0.0004 0.1063 
    (6.96)*** (0.20) (2.49)** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0270 0.0091 -0.2514 -0.0203 0.0082 -0.2508 
 (-38.44)*** (29.56)*** (-38.01)*** (-30.47)*** (28.55)*** (-40.40)*** 
Leveraget 0.5335 -0.0383 0.3178 0.3687 -0.0383 0.4211 
 (67.14)*** (-11.29)*** (4.34)*** (47.97)*** (-11.40)*** (5.82)*** 
ROAt -0.4501 -0.1496 -7.0033 -0.9515 -0.1317 -7.3962 
 (-29.69)*** (-22.41)*** (-48.62)*** (-61.64)*** (-19.27)*** (-50.30)*** 
STD_Rett -0.0313   -0.2552   
 (-2.95)***   (-24.20)***   
Casht -0.1172   -0.2297   
 (-7.39)***   (-14.70)***   
ΔCasht 0.2876   0.1239   
 (61.12)***   (27.18)***   
Ratet -1.1380   0.0793   
 (-4.20)***   (0.30)   
Inten_RDt -0.0038 0.0058 -0.0750 -0.0117 0.0064 -0.0798 
 (-1.01) (3.52)*** (-2.10)** (-3.15)*** (3.89)*** (-2.24)** 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat for H0:  γ11 + γ12 + γ13 = 0 72.10***   18.48***   
F-stat for H0:  δ11 + δ12 + δ13 = 0 243.97***   402.16***   
F-stat for H0:  β21 + β22 + β23 = 0  318.08***   97.78***  
F-stat for H0:  β31 + β32 + β33 = 0   25.63***   0.53 
Sample size 26,280 26,271 
Sys. weighted R2 0.7880 0.7917 
AIC number for VARX (1) -397,956 -398,824 -397,824 -396,725 -396,733 -396,733 
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AIC number for VARX (3) -308,057 -308,065 -308,065 -308,405 -308,413 -308,413 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The tri-variate VARX(3) model used in this table consists of the following three equations: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + β12BRt-2 + β13BRt-3 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + γ12UC_PCAt-2 + γ13UC_PCAt-3 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + δ12CC_PCAt-2                         (6) 
+ δ13CC_PCAt-3 + α22Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13 STD_Rett + α14Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet + α16Inten_RDt + α17Casht  
+ α18ΔCasht + ∑α1j Ind_Dum1j + ∑α1k Year_Dum1k + ε11 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + β22BRt-2 + β23BRt-3 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 +γ22UC_PCAt-2 + γ23UC_PCAt-3 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + δ22CC_PCAt-2          (7) 
+ δ23CC_PCAt-3 + α22Leveraget + α23ROAt + α24Ln(MV)t + α25Inten_RDt + ∑α2jInd_Dum2j + ∑α2kYear_Dum2k + ε21 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + β32BRt-2 + β33BRt-3 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + γ32UC_PCAt-2 + γ33UC_PCAt-3 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + δ32CC_PCAt-2     (8) 
+ δ33CC_PCAt-3 + α32Leveraget + α33ROAt + α34 Ln(MV)t + α35Inten_RDt + ∑α3jInd_Dum3j + ∑α3k Year_Dum3k + ε31 
where BR = EDF in Model 1 and BR = Campbell in Model 2. 
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Table 4  Causal Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism  
and Subsequent Actual Bankruptcy Estimated by Logit Models 
 
This table reports estimation results for logit models that regress the bankruptcy indicator BANK on unconditional and 
conditional conservatism metrics UC_PCA and CC_PCA and control variables.  As testing variables, Model 1 uses 
UC_PCA, Model 2 uses CC_PCA and Models 3 to 5 use both UC_PCA and CC_PCA.   Models 4 and 5 add earnings 
management (Emgmt) and earnings smoothing (Esmooth) as control variables, respectively.  Model details are 
provided below. 
 
Independent 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
Intercept -26.7094 -26.8657 -26.7027 -26.7179 -26.2651 
 (-12.93)*** (-13.01)*** (-12.91)*** (-12.80)*** (-11.98)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -1.0837  -1.0844 -1.0763 -1.1358 
 (-2.38)**  (-2.38)** (-2.36)** (-2.44)** 
CC_PCAt-1  0.0026 0.0045 0.0035 -0.0084 
  (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (-0.19) 
Emgmtt-1      0.1775  
    (0.68)  
Esmootht-1     -0.3326 
      (-1.00) 
Nimtaavgt-1 -1.8605 -1.8098 -1.8543 -1.8134 -1.8142 
 (-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.44) (-1.36) 
Leveraget-1 1.8871 1.8253 1.8850 1.8818 2.2959 
 (2.46)** (2.39)** (2.47)** (2.46)** (2.73)*** 
Exretavgt-1 -6.5512 -6.3473 -6.5619 -6.6528 -6.0151 
 (-2.32)** (-2.24)** (-2.32)** (-2.34)** (-2.06)** 
Rsizet-1 -0.2951 -0.3035 -0.2939 -0.2884 -0.3422 
 (-3.20)*** (-3.30)*** (-3.14)*** (-3.03)*** (-3.51)*** 
STD_Rett-1 1.3001 1.2614 1.2989 1.2946 1.2937 
 (3.30)*** (3.18)*** (3.29)*** (3.25)*** (3.00)*** 
Casht-1 -5.0233 -4.8829 -5.0187 -4.8938 -4.6751 
 (-3.40)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.39)*** (-3.31)*** (-3.17)*** 
ΔCasht-1 3.4642 3.3340 3.4604 3.3898 3.7284 
 (1.34) (1.31) (1.34) (1.32) (1.41) 
Mbt-1 0.0633 0.0068 0.0627 0.0776 0.2711 
 (0.25) (0.03) (0.24) (0.31) (1.08) 
Pricet-1 0.8508 0.8303 0.8510 0.8422 0.8439 
 (3.42)*** (3.34)*** (3.42)*** (3.37)*** (3.21)*** 
Ratet-1 35.4836 34.0016 35.5005 35.7905 34.9742 
 (1.00) (0.97) (1.00) (1.00) (0.91) 
Inten_RDt-1 -19.1577 -19.6993 -19.1563 -18.9446 -18.4807 
 (-2.09)** (-2.22)** (-2.09)** (-2.04)** (-2.06)** 
Year and Ind Dum  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 30,986 30,986 30,986 30,941 29,614 
Bankruptcy obs. 205 205 205 205 205 
Psuedo R-square 0.2422 0.2392 0.2422 0.2428 0.2586 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The logit model used in this table is: 
BANKit = α + γCONit-1 + Controlsit-1 + µt (9) 
where BANK is the bankruptcy indicator equal to one for bankrupt firms and zero otherwise; CON refers to UC_PCA in Model 1, 
CC_PCA in Model 2 and to both UC_PCA and CC_PCA in Models 3 to 5.  In Models 1 to 5, Controls include market-based 
profitability (NIMTAVG), predictability of excess return (EXRETAVG), market-to-book ratio (Mb), excess firm size (Rsize), leverage 
ratio (Leverage), liquidity (Cash), ratio of cash flow to total assets (ΔCash), return volatility (STD_Ret), stock price (PRICE), risk-
free rate (Rate), R&D intensity (Inten_RD), and year and industry dummies. 
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Table 5  Cash Enhancing and Informational Roles of Accounting Conservatism  
and Causal Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and 
Subsequent Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for tri-variate VARX (1) models using conditional and unconditional 
conservatism, bankruptcy risk and their interactions with cash or information asymmetry as autoregressive vectors.  
Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and Campbell; unconditional and conditional conservatism measurements are 
UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively.  Model details are provided below. 
 
Panel A:  Tests for Cash Enhancing Role of Conservatism 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables 
EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.2944 -0.0308 3.0679 0.3040 -0.0296 3.1702 
 (13.92)*** (-8.27)*** (39.82)*** (14.43)*** (-8.04)*** (41.68)*** 
UC_PCAt-1*Casht-1 -0.3010   -0.3437   
 (-9.46)***   (-10.85)***   
UC_PCA t-1 -0.0321 0.8838 0.0997 -0.0067 0.8839 0.0620 
 (-5.06)*** (354.25)*** (1.93)* (-1.06) (354.90)*** (1.20) 
CC_PCA t-1*Casht-1 -0.0276   -0.0115   
 (-5.83)***   (-2.44)**   
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0050 0.0010 -0.0146 -0.0092 0.0008 -0.0099 
 (-7.02)*** (3.66)*** (-2.62)*** (-12.93)*** (2.89)*** (-1.77)* 
EDF t-1 0.3527 0.0438 -0.3785    
 (77.54)*** (21.35)*** (-8.93)***    
Campbellt-1    0.4619 0.0432 -0.5588 
    (107.04)*** (22.48)*** (-14.08)*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic for H0:  θ11+ γ11 = 0 131.31*** 146.52*** 
F-statistic for H0:  δ11+ θ12 = 0 55.70*** 22.64*** 
Sample size 30,276 30,270 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6018 0.5893 
Panel B:  Tests for Information Role of Conservatism 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables 
EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.3039 -0.0308 3.0679 0.3198 -0.0296 3.1702 
 (14.29)*** (-8.27)*** (39.82)*** (15.07)*** (-8.04)*** (41.68)*** 
UC_PCAt-1*STD_Rett-1 -0.0453   -0.1367   
 (-3.00)***   (-9.07)***   
UC_PCA t-1 -0.0305 0.8838 0.0997 0.0346 0.8839 0.0620 
 (-3.20)*** (354.25)*** (1.93)* (3.65)*** (354.90)*** (1.20) 
CC_PCA t-1*STD_Rett-1 -0.0201   -0.0004   
 (-10.56)***   (-0.20)   
CC_PCAt-1 0.0026 0.0010 -0.0146 -0.0097 0.0008 -0.0099 
 (2.40)** (3.66)*** (-2.62)*** (-8.95)*** (2.89)*** (-1.77)* 
EDF t-1 0.3760 0.0438 -0.3785    
 (77.80)*** (21.35)*** (-8.93)***    
Campbellt-1    0.4666 0.0432 -0.5588 
    (106.88)*** (22.48)*** (-14.08)*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic for H0:  θ11+ γ11 = 0 68.82*** 125.08*** 
F-statistic for H0:  δ11+ θ12 = 0 231.59*** 76.27*** 
Sample size 30,276 30,270 
Sys. weighted R2 0.7761 0.7778 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The tri-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following three equations: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + θ11Rolet-1*UC_PCAt-1 + θ12Role*CC_PCAt-1 + θ13Rolet-1 + Controls + ε11 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21 UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + Controls + ε21 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + θ32Rolet-1 + Controls + ε31 
where Role = Cash and STD_Ret in Panels A and B, respectively.  Controls are the same as those in the corresponding equations (3) to (5). 
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Table 6  SOX, Auditor Resignations and Causal Relations between Bankruptcy Risk 
and Subsequent Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for tri-variate VARX (1) models with bankruptcy risk, unconditional and 
conditional conservatism as dependent variables, and with their one-period lags and interactions with post-SOX (SOX) and 
post-auditor-resignation periods (Aud_resign) as autoregressive vectors.  Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and Campbell; 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures are UC_PCA and CC_PCA, respectively.  Model details are provided 
below. 
 
Panel A:  SOX and Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.3505 0.0304 2.9754 0.3858 0.0318 3.0675 
 (17.04)*** (5.31)*** (46.08)*** (18.10)*** (5.65)*** (48.38)*** 
UC_PCAt-1*SOX -0.0322   0.0009   
 (-3.69)***   (0.10)   
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0327 0.6636 0.1056 -0.0197 0.6641 0.0743 
 (-6.67)*** (184.04)** (2.60)*** (-3.89)*** (184.19)** (1.83) 
CC_PCAt-1*SOX -0.0007   -0.0040   
 (-0.56)   (-3.13)***   
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0081 0.0014 -0.0130 -0.0102 0.0012 -0.0076 
 (-13.42)** (3.21)*** (-2.58)*** (-16.21)** (2.75)*** (-1.51) 
EDFt-1*SOX  0.0105 -0.0261    
  (1.81)* (-0.39)    
EDFt-1 0.2456 0.0316 -0.2777    
 (62.18)*** (9.04)*** (-7.03)***    
Campbellt-1*SOX     0.0135 0.1041 
     (2.37)** (1.59) 
Campbellt-1    0.3331 0.0320 -0.4661 
    (85.15)*** (9.58)*** (-12.34)** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 34,896 34,890 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6016 0.5893 
Panel B:  Auditor Resignations and Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt 
Intercept 0.2311 0.0116 3.0028 0.3840 0.0011 2.9924 
 (4.32)*** (0.32) (6.98)*** (7.19)*** (0.03) (7.01)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.1108 0.6775 -0.0284 -0.0593 0.6774 -0.0419 
 (-2.79)*** (26.99)*** (-0.09) (-1.49) (27.05)*** (-0.14) 
UC_PCA t-1*Aud_resignt-1 -0.0400   0.0062   
 (-0.73)   (0.11)   
CC_PCA t-1 -0.0042 0.0052 -0.0549 -0.0215 0.0050 -0.0545 
 (-0.73) (1.56) (-1.38) (-3.72)*** (1.49) (-1.36) 
CC_PCAt-1*Aud_resignt-1 -0.0062   0.0009   
 (-0.80)   (0.11)   
EDF t-1 0.0910 0.0235 0.0515    
 (3.34)*** (0.99) (0.18)    
EDFt-1*Aud_resignt-1  0.0792 0.0407    
  (2.56)** (0.10)    
Campbellt-1    0.2751 0.0437 0.0965 
    (10.14)*** (1.84)* (0.34) 
Campbellt-1*Aud_resignt-1     0.0522 -0.1155 
     (1.67)* (-0.30) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 732 732 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6782 0.6351 
The tri-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following three equations: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + θ11Expt-1*UC_PCAt-1 + θ12Expt-1*CC_PCAt-1 + θ13Expt-1 + Controls + ε11 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + θ21Expt-1*BRt-1 + θ22Expt-1 + Controls + ε21 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + θ31Expt-1*BRt-1 + θ32Expt-1 + Controls + ε31 
where Exp = SOX and Aud_Resign in Panels A and B, respectively.  Controls are the same as in the corresponding equations (3) to (5). 
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Table 7  Conservatism Gaming and Causal Relations between Unconditional and 
Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the SUR estimation results for tetra-variate VARX (1) models with bankruptcy risk, unconditional and 
conditional conservatism and conservatism gaming as dependent variables and their one-period lags as autoregressive 
vectors.  Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and Campbell.  Model 1 uses EDF, UC_PCA, CC_PCA and Esmooth as the 
autoregressive vector; Model 2 uses Campbell, UC_PCA, CC_PCA and Esmooth as the autoregressive vector.  Model 
details are provided below. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent 
Variables EDFt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Esmootht Campbellt UC_PCAt CC_PCAt Esmootht 
Intercept 0.4339 0.0191 2.9232 0.1992 0.4795 0.0214 3.0107 0.1979 
 (27.76)*** (3.62)*** (43.49)*** (15.07)*** (29.57)*** (4.11)*** (45.50)*** (15.18)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0463 0.6789 0.1222 -0.0264 -0.0215 0.6792 0.0823 -0.0261 
 (-8.94)*** (185.10)*** (2.62)*** (-2.87)*** (-4.02)*** (185.08)*** (1.77)* (-2.84)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0077 0.0018 -0.0129 0.0010 -0.0110 0.0016 -0.0077 0.0009 
 (-13.34)*** (4.44)*** (-2.46)** (0.96) (-18.33)*** (3.93)*** (-1.46) (0.91) 
Esmootht-1 0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0424 0.7185 -0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0451 0.7186 
 (0.42) (-1.94)* (-2.20)** (189.28)*** (-1.85)* (-1.98)** (-2.34)** (189.30)*** 
EDFt-1 0.2510 0.0405 -0.2684 -0.0023     
 (60.04)*** (13.71)*** (-7.15)*** (-0.31)     
Campbellt-1     0.3405 0.0396 -0.4287 -0.0003 
     (82.13)*** (14.01)*** (-11.95)*** (-0.05) 
Ln(MV)t -0.0374 0.0157 -0.2657 -0.0010 -0.0308 0.0151 -0.2675 -0.0009 
 (-61.02)*** (37.62)*** (-49.91)*** (-0.92) (-49.70)*** (37.45)*** (-52.21)*** (-0.85) 
Leveraget 0.6472 -0.0685 0.2969 0.0516 0.4698 -0.0680 0.3835 0.0505 
 (89.93)*** (-13.93)*** (4.74)*** (4.19)*** (63.90)*** (-13.88)*** (6.16)*** (4.12)*** 
ROAt -0.4005 -0.2626 -6.4814 0.0991 -0.9346 -0.2513 -6.6653 0.1003 
 (-30.75)*** (-28.83)*** (-55.91)*** (4.35)*** (-68.24)*** (-27.21)*** (-56.80)*** (4.34)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3233    0.1706    
 (74.66)***    (38.25)***    
Casht -0.0341    -0.3149    
 (-3.58)***    (-31.66)***    
ΔCasht  -0.0685    -0.1386    
 (-4.81)***    (-9.38)***    
Ratet -2.0966    -1.1019    
 (-11.23)***    (-5.70)***    
Inten_RDt -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0080  -0.0010 0.0023 -0.0085  
 (-0.89) (6.15)*** (-1.70)*  (-1.93)** (6.28)*** (-1.81)*  
Volatility_ROAt    -0.0110    -0.0102 
    (-0.48)    (-0.45) 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 133.83*** 188.03*** 51.10***  179.80*** 196.44*** 142.80***  
Sample size 32,361 32,355 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6080 0.5990 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The tetra-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following four equations: 
BRt  = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + θ11Esmootht-1 + Controls + ε11 (10) 
UC_PCAt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + θ21Esmootht-1 + Controls + ε21 (11) 
CC_PCAt = α30 + β31BRt-1 + γ31UC_PCAt-1 + δ31CC_PCAt-1 + θ31Esmootht-1 + Controls + ε31 (12) 
Esmootht = α40 + β41BRt-1 + γ41UC_PCAt-1 + δ41CC_PCAt-1 + θ41Esmootht-1 + α41Leveraget + α42ROAt + α43Ln(MV)t  (13) 
     + α44Volatility_ROAt + ∑α4jInd_Dumj + ∑α4kYear_Dum4k + ε41 
where BR = EDF and Campbell in Models 1 and 2, respectively.  F-statistics in columns 2 and 6 are for H0:  γ11 = 0, δ11 = 0; in columns 3 
and 7 for H0:  β21 = 0; in columns 4 and 8 for H0:  β31 = 0.  Controls in equations (10) to (12) are the same as in equations (3) to (5). 
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Appendix A  Causal Relations between Unconditional Conservatism and 
Bankruptcy Risk and between Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This appendix reports estimation models and results for examining relations between unconditional conservatism 
and bankruptcy risk using the bi-variate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (1a) and (2a) to test hypotheses 
H1a and H2a: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11UCt-1 + Controlst + ε11 (1a) 
UCt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21UCt-1 + Controlst + ε21, (2a) 
where UC refers to an unconditional conservatism metric UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES or UC_PCA, and BR 
refers to a bankruptcy risk measure EDF or Campbell.  The autoregressive vector includes BRt-1 and UCt-1.  
Exogenous Controlst in equations (1b) and (2b) are the same as in equations (3) and (4), respectively, where H1a 
and H1b predict that γ11 < 0 and β21 > 0, respectively. 
Table A.1  Causal Relations between Unconditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for bi-variate VARX (1) equations (1b) and (2b) for unconditional conservatism.  
Panel A (Panel B) presents results for models using EDF (Campbell) bankruptcy risk measure.  Unconditional conservatism 
measures are UC_PCA, UC_BM, UC_ACC and UC_RES.  Model details are provided below. 
 
Panel A:  VARX (1) Model Results when Bankruptcy Risk is EDF  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Independent 
Variables 
EDFt UC_PCAt EDFt UC_BMt EDFt UC_ACCt EDFt UC_RESt 
Intercept 0.3426 0.0224 0.3397 -0.0342 0.3403 -0.0068 0.3365 0.0979 
 (16.66)*** (4.40)*** (16.60)*** (-5.24)*** (16.11)*** (-4.58)*** (15.91)*** (19.85)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0458 0.6624       
 (-9.35)*** (186.96)***       
UC_BMt-1   -0.0310 0.7169     
   (-8.57)*** (211.91)***     
UC_ACCt-1     -0.1087 0.5198   
     (-5.54)*** (121.07)***   
UC_RESt-1       -0.0155 0.4717 
       (-2.55)** (108.82)*** 
EDFt-1 0.2387 0.0409 0.2386 0.0709 0.2465 0.0051 0.2463 -0.0127 
 (60.65)*** (14.42)*** (60.32)*** (19.35)*** (63.52)*** (6.06)*** (63.46)*** (-4.59)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0362 0.0158 -0.0364 0.0199 -0.0373 0.0023 -0.0374 -0.0008 
 (-62.82)*** (39.60)*** (-63.34)*** (38.76)*** (-65.38)*** (19.34)*** (-65.53)*** (-2.08)** 
Leveraget 0.6461 -0.0639 0.6432 -0.0132 0.6356 -0.0173 0.6345 -0.0947 
 (95.00)*** (-13.45)*** (94.26)*** (-2.14)** (93.29)*** (-12.09)*** (92.88)*** (-20.04)*** 
ROAt -0.4196 -0.2572 -0.4186 0.0106 -0.4291 -0.1458 -0.4265 -0.3507 
 (-33.31)*** (-28.56)*** (-33.22)*** (0.91) (-33.98)*** (-53.79)*** (-33.72)*** (-39.27)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3161  0.3131  0.3029  0.3058  
 (76.35)***  (76.18)***  (71.25)***  (71.60)***  
Casht -0.0388  -0.0477  -0.0457  -0.0557  
 (-4.26)***  (-3.50)***  (-3.23)***  (-3.93)***  
ΔCasht -0.0638  -0.0694  -0.0703  -0.0715  
 (-4.65)***  (-7.68)***  (-7.48)***  (-7.57)***  
Ratet -1.1990  -1.1148  -1.1902  -1.1492  
 (-5.04)***  (-4.72)***  (-4.85)***  (-4.68)***  
Inten_RDt -0.0005 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0045 
 (-1.00) (6.11)*** (-0.93) (1.23) (-0.93) (-1.68)* (-0.93) (11.89)*** 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 87.51*** 208.08*** 73.44*** 374.50*** 30.74*** 36.77*** 6.50** 21.03*** 
Sample size 34,896 34,896 34,896 34,896 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6857 0.7035 0.5821 0.5962 
Panel B:  VARX (1) Model Results when Bankruptcy Risk is Campbell  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Independent 
Variables Campbellt UC_PCAt Campbellt UC_BMt Campbellt UC_ACCt Campbellt UC_RESt 
Intercept 0.3726 0.0347 0.3672 -0.0351 0.3751 -0.0059 0.3717 0.0668 
 (17.43)*** (6.66)*** (17.32)*** (-5.48)*** (17.12)*** (-4.03)*** (16.98)*** (19.45)*** 
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UC_PCAt-1 -0.0231 0.5811       
 (-4.98)*** (172.12)***       
UC_BMt-1   -0.0150 0.7187     
   (-4.01)*** (212.72)***     
UC_ACCt-1     -0.0067 0.5183   
     (-0.33) (120.45)***   
UC_RESt-1       -0.0134 0.5221 
       (-1.65)* (132.62)*** 
Campbellt-1 0.3222 0.0337 0.3211 0.0772 0.3244 0.0040 0.3246 -0.0042 
 (82.95)*** (12.00)*** (82.07)*** (22.11)*** (84.25)*** (4.99)*** (84.55)*** (-2.27)** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0285 0.0170 -0.0287 0.0191 -0.0295 0.0022 -0.0293 0.0020 
 (-49.08)*** (42.67)*** (-49.45)*** (38.80)*** (-51.25)*** (19.13)*** (-50.99)*** (7.57)*** 
Leveraget 0.4709 -0.0712 0.4672 -0.0168 0.4615 -0.0168 0.4624 -0.0906 
 (67.73)*** (-14.46)*** (67.02)*** (-2.75)*** (66.29)*** (-11.76)*** (66.22)*** (-27.25)*** 
ROAt -0.9579 -0.2793 -0.9612 0.0349 -0.9673 -0.1453 -0.9659 -0.3136 
 (-72.33)*** (-29.42)*** (-72.60)*** (2.98)*** (-72.91)*** (-52.91)*** (-72.47)*** (-48.90)** 
STD_Rett 0.1655  0.1634  0.1549  0.1576  
 (38.68)***  (38.62)***  (35.32)***  (35.88)***  
Casht -0.1368  -0.1234  -0.1196  -0.1334  
 (-9.58)***  (-8.72)***  (-8.13)***  (-9.08)***  
ΔCasht -0.3227  -0.3498  -0.3615  -0.3507  
 (-33.87)***  (-37.11)***  (-36.81)***  (-35.51)***  
Ratet -0.1104  0.0047  -0.0734  -0.0593  
 (-0.45)  (0.02)  (-0.29)  (-0.23)  
Inten_RDt -0.0011 0.0025 -0.0011 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0031 
 (-2.10)** (6.36)*** (-2.03)** (1.41) (-2.00)** (-1.65)* (-2.02)** (11.71)*** 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 19.70*** 228.45*** 16.09*** 488.85*** 0.11 24.90*** 2.71** 5.16** 
Sample size 34,890 34,890 34,890 34,890 
Sys. weighted R2 0.6742 0.6960 0.6965 0.6242 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90% , 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The bi-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following two equations:  
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11CONt-1 + α11Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13STD_Rett + α14Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet + α16Inten_RDt  (1b) 
+ α17Casht + α18ΔCasht + ∑α1jInd_Dum1j + ∑α1kYear_Dum1k + ε11 
CONt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ22CONt-1 + α21Leveraget + α22ROAt + α23Ln(MV)t + α24Inten_RDt + ∑α2jInd_Dum2j  (2b) 
+ ∑α2kYear_Dum2k + ε21 
where BR = EDF in Panel A and BR = Campbell in Panel B.  CON = UC_PCA in Model 1, CON = UC_BM in Model 2, CON = UC_ACC in 
Model 3 and CON = UC_RES in Model 4. 
F-statistics reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 are for H0:  γ11 = 0; those reported in columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 are for H0:  β21 = 0. 
Panel A of Table A.1 reveals that all four measures of unconditional conservatism, UC_PCAt-1, UC_BMt-1, 
UC_ACCt-1, and UC_RESt-1, are significantly negatively associated with the subsequent bankruptcy risk as 
measured by EDFt; Panel B reports the same pattern for Campbellt.  For the null hypothesis that the predictor 
coefficients for EDFt and Campbellt are equal to zero, F-statistics are all significant beyond the 95% confidence 
level except for UC_ACCt-1 in Panel B.  These findings support hypothesis H1a in suggesting that the cash 
enhancing and informational roles of unconditional conservatism lowers subsequent bankruptcy risk.  Panel A of 
Table A.1 further shows that EDFt-1 and Campbellt-1 are significantly positively associated with subsequent 
unconditional conservatism except for UC_RES, suggesting that prior bankruptcy risk Granger-causes subsequent 
unconditional conservatism, consistent with hypothesis H1b.  UC_RESt exhibits negative coefficients (t-statistics) 
of -0.0127 (-4.59) for EDFt-1 in Panel A, and -0.0042 (-2.27) for Campbellt-1 in Panel B.  Although this result is 
inconsistent with H1b, it is consistent with the intuition that extreme unconditional conservatism in the form of 
immediate expensing of R&D and advertising expenditures is detrimental to managers’ career motives, and 
dominates managers’ disciplinary concerns and auditor and regulator interests, resulting in disincentives for 
UC_RESt as bankruptcy risk rises.  Nor does this negative association for UC_RESt qualitatively change the 
positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional conservatism exhibited by the 
combined measure UC_PCAt.  For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for UC_PCAt, UC_BMt, 
UC_ACCt and UC_RESt are equal to zero, F-statistics indicate rejection beyond the 95% confidence level.  
Overall, these findings support hypothesis H1b in suggesting that bankruptcy risk stimulates subsequent 
unconditional conservatism, consistent with the interests of auditors, creditors and regulators offsetting managers’ 
career motives in the case of unconditional conservatism, as predicted.  The signs of the coefficients of the 
exogenous control variable are also consistent with predictions.  For example, EDFt and Campbellt are generally 
positively associated with Leveraget and STD_Rett, and negatively associated with ROAt, Ln(MV)t, Ratet, Casht, 
ΔCasht and Inten_RDt. 
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Appendix B  Causal Relations between Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This appendix reports estimation results regarding relations between conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk 
using bi-variate VARX (1).  In particular, the following bi-variate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (1b) 
and (2b) tests hypotheses H1b and H2b regarding causal relations between conditional conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk: 
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11CCt-1 + Controlst + ε11 (1b) 
CCt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ21CCt-1 + Controlst + ε21, (2b) 
where CC refers to a conditional conservatism metric CC_ACM, CC_AR, CC_CR or CC_PCA, and BR refers to a 
bankruptcy risk measure EDF or Campbell.  The autoregressive vector includes BRt-1 and CCt-1.  Controlst in 
equations (3b) and (4b) are the same as in equations (4) and (6), respectively, with the same predictions.  H1b and 
H2b predict that γ11 < 0 and β21 < 0, respectively, and Table B.1 reports the SUR estimation results. 
Table B.1 Causal Relations between Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the SUR estimation results for bi-variate VARX (1) equations (1b) and (2b) for conditional conservatism.  
Panel A (Panel B) presents results for models using EDF (Campbell) bankruptcy risk measure.  Conditional conservatism 
measurements are CC_PCA, CC_AR, CC_CR and CC_ACM.  Model details are provided below. 
 
Panel A:  Bivariate VARX (1) Model Results when Bankruptcy Risk is EDF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Independent 
Variables EDFt CC_PCAt EDFt CC_ARt EDFt CC_CRt EDFt CC_ACMt 
Intercept 0.3478 3.0130 0.6136 3.8327 0.3369 0.3381 0.3368 0.0051 
 (16.48)*** (48.06)*** (29.70)*** (186.58)*** (15.92)*** (4.43)*** (15.92)*** (3.77)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0084 -0.0124       
 (-15.26)*** (-2.47)**       
CC_ARt-1   -0.0724 0.2947     
   (-59.20)*** (93.98)***     
CC_CRt-1     -0.0009 -0.0260   
     (-2.06)** (-5.06)***   
CC_ACMt-1       -0.0570 0.5317 
       (-2.54)** (119.59)*** 
EDFt-1 0.2531 -0.2990 0.3006 -0.3017 0.2468 -0.3311 0.2463 -0.0054 
 (64.97)*** (-8.47)*** (78.55)*** (-30.83)*** (63.48)*** (-7.69)*** (63.46)*** (-7.07)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0389 -0.2648 -0.0641 -0.3903 -0.0374 0.0174 -0.0373 0.0010 
 
(-67.39)*** (-52.56)*** (-89.55)*** 
(-
215.72)*** (-65.58)*** (2.86)*** (-65.33)*** (8.90)*** 
Leveraget 0.6343 0.3211 0.6495 0.9121 0.6345 -0.2801 0.6350 0.0065 
 (93.34)*** (5.40)*** (99.84)*** (56.87)*** (93.06)*** (-3.84)*** (93.13)*** (5.03)*** 
ROAt -0.4323 -6.5718 -0.3462 -0.7408 -0.4274 -7.8724 -0.4252 -0.0695 
 (-34.33)*** (-58.30)*** (-28.61)*** (-24.28)*** (-33.78)*** (-56.78)*** (-33.68)*** (-28.33)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3088  0.3451  0.3040  0.3052  
 (72.69)***  (85.17)***  (71.35)***  (71.61)***  
Casht -0.0780  -0.1184  -0.0776  -0.0796  
 (-8.33)***  (-13.28)***  (-8.26)***  (-8.48)***  
ΔCasht -0.0484  -0.0161  -0.0526  -0.0512  
 (-3.42)***  (-1.20)  (-3.71)***  (-3.61)***  
Ratet -1.1459  -1.4083  -1.1560  -1.1476  
 (-4.68)***  (-6.04)***  (-4.70)***  (-4.67)***  
Inten_RDt -0.0005 -0.0084 -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0087 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (-0.89) (-1.77)* (-1.12) (-1.54) (-0.91) (-1.49) (-0.89) (-2.46)** 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 
232.76*** 71.82*** 
3,505.80 
*** 950.78*** 4.26** 59.09*** 6.48** 49.97*** 
Sample size 34,890 34,896 34,896 34,896 
Sys. weighted R2 0.5516 0.8353 0.5263 0.5670 
Panel B:  Bivariate VARX (1) Model Results when Bankruptcy Risk is Campbell 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Independent 
Variables Campbellt CC_PCAt Campbellt CC_ARt Campbellt CC_CRt Campbellt CC_ACMt 
Intercept 0.3872 3.0793 0.6594 3.7606 0.3691 0.5207 0.3730 0.0062 
 (17.75)*** (49.92)*** (30.78)*** (182.83)*** (16.86)*** (6.94)*** (17.03)*** (4.63)*** 
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CC_PCAt-1 -0.0110 -0.0073       
 (-19.34)*** (-1.46)       
CC_ARt-1   -0.0721 0.2883     
   (-54.88)*** (88.02)***     
CC_CRt-1     -0.0035 -0.0228   
     (-7.31)*** (-4.45)***   
CC_ACMt-1       -0.0376 0.5323 
       (-1.62) (119.81)*** 
Campbellt-1 0.3353 -0.4505 0.4035 -0.1588 0.3261 -0.6585 0.3241 -0.0076 
 (86.81)*** (-13.36)*** (102.64)*** (-16.29)*** (84.80)*** (-16.07)*** (84.42)*** (-10.44)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0315 -0.2663 -0.0579 -0.3824 -0.0294 0.0070 -0.0294 0.0009 
 (-54.20)*** (-55.09)*** (-78.07)*** (-210.63)*** (-51.18)*** (1.21) (-51.12)*** (9.05)*** 
Leveraget 0.4599 0.4018 0.4722 0.8396 0.4603 -0.1020 0.4610 0.0077 
 (66.42)*** (6.80)*** (70.79)*** (52.10)*** (66.18)*** (-1.41) (66.23)*** (5.96)*** 
ROAt -0.9714 -6.7584 -0.8700 -0.7316 -0.9720 -8.1852 -0.9665 -0.0727 
 (-73.62)*** (-59.29)*** (-67.69)*** (-23.31)*** (-73.23)*** (-58.44)*** (-72.86)*** (-29.26)*** 
STD_Rett 0.1608  0.1480  0.1569  0.1567  
 (36.82)***  (35.41)***  (35.79)***  (35.70)***  
Casht -0.3607  -0.3421  -0.3627  -0.3665  
 (-37.00)***  (-36.75)***  (-37.05)***  (-37.42)***  
ΔCasht -0.1209  -0.1017  -0.1235  -0.1227  
 (-8.27)***  (-7.27)***  (-8.41)***  (-8.35)***  
Ratet -0.0478  -0.2909  -0.0326  -0.0475  
 (-0.19)  (-1.20)  (-0.13)  (-0.19)  
Inten_RDt -0.0010 -0.0089 -0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0094 -0.0011 -0.0003 
 (-1.95)** (-1.88)* (-2.21)** (-1.69)* (-1.97)** (-1.61) (-1.97)** (-2.55)** 
Year and Ind Dum Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 
373.87*** 166.27*** 
3,013.92 
*** 265.65*** 53.43*** 258.29*** 2.63 108.91*** 
Sample size 34,890 34,890 34,890 34,890 
Sys. weighted R2 0.5300 0.8111 0.5043 0.5471 
*, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
The bi-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following two equations:  
BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11CONt-1 + α11Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13STD_Rett + α14 Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet + α16Inten_RDt  (1b) 
+ α17Casht + α18ΔCasht + ∑α1jInd_Dum1j + ∑α1kYear_Dum1k + ε11 
CONt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ22CONt-1 + α21Leveraget + α22ROAt + α23Ln(MV)t + α24Inten_RDt + ∑α2jInd_Dum2j  (2b) 
+ ∑α2kYear_Dum2k + ε21 
where BR = EDF in Panel A and BR = Campbell in Panel B.  CON = CC_PCA in Model 1, CON = CC_AR in Model 2, CON = CC_CR in 
Model 3 and CON = CC_ACM in Model 4. 
F-statistics reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 are for H0:  γ11 = 0; those reported in columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 are for H0:  β21 = 0. 
Panel A of Table B.1 reveals that all four measures of conditional conservatism, CC_PCAt-1, CC_ARt-1, CC_CRt-1 
and CC_ACMt-1, are negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk as  measured by EDFt, and Panel B 
reveals the same pattern for Campbellt-1.  For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for EDFt and 
Campbellt are equal to zero, F-statistics are all significant beyond the 90% confidence level except for CC_ACMt-1 
in Panel B.  These findings suggest that conditional conservatism reduces subsequent bankruptcy risk, consistent 
with the cash enhancing and informational properties of conditional conservatism as predicted by hypothesis H2b.  
Table B.1 further shows that bankruptcy risk metrics EDFt-1 and Campbellt-1 are uniformly negatively associated 
with subsequent conditional conservatism measured by CC_PCAt, CC_ARt, CC_CRt and CC_ACMt.  These findings 
suggest that prior bankruptcy risk lowers subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with hypothesis H2b.  For 
the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for CC_PCAt, CC_ARt, CC_CRt and CC_ACMt are equal to zero, 
F-statistics are all significant beyond the 99% confidence level.  These findings support hypothesis H2b in 
suggesting that bankruptcy risk reduces subsequent conditional conservatism, and they are consistent with the 
notion that although it mitigates subsequent bankruptcy risk, conditional conservatism is resisted by managers 
whose career motives dominate their disciplinary concerns, as predicted. 
 
